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Assessing APEC's Role in Economic

Integration in the Asia-Pacific Region
Merit E. Janow*

INTRODUCTION

This article examines the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) forum as a new institution to promote economic integration
in the Asia-Pacific region. APEC does not lend itself to straightfor-

ward definition. Formed only recently in 1989, APEC is currently
comprised of 18 member "economies" 1 and is organized around a set
of intergovernmental meetings. Its very nomenclature, APEC, lacks a
descriptive noun.2
At this stage in its development, APEC is neither a formalized
free-trade arrangement, such as that embodied in the U.S.-Canada
Free Trade Agreement or the North America Free Trade Agreement
* Professor in the Practice of International Trade, School of International and Public Affairs
(SIPA), Columbia University, co-director APEC Study Center, Columbia University. She
teaches international trade law at Columbia Law School and international economic and trade
policy at SIPA. From 1990-1993, Professor Janow was Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan and China in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Executive Office of the
President, Washington D.C. Prior to joining USTR, Professor Janow practiced international corporate law. She has a J.D. from Columbia Law School and a B.A. from the University of Michigan in Asian Studies.
1 The 18 members of APEC include: China, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, Papua New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand,
Chile, Mexico, South Korea, Japan, the United States and Canada. The terminology "economies" as distinct from countries was adopted by APEC to overcome the political difficulties
associated with APEC's inclusion of China, Taiwan (called Chinese-Taipei for APEC purposes)
and Hong Kong.
2 This same point was made in: Martin Rudner, InstitutionalApproaches to Regional Trade
and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Area. 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTErrM. PROBS. 159 (1994).
Journalists have put this more crudely. See A Forestof Acronyms, AsAvEEK, Nov. 16, 1994, at
29.
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(NAFrA), nor a policy and discussion forum such as the OECD. And
it is not seen as being the first step toward the creation of a Europeanstyle common market. Instead, it has coined the seemingly oxymoronic term of "open regionalism" to describe its approach to trade
and economic issues.
Thus far, APEC members have shown little willingness to formalize APEC by means of binding agreements on a defined set of substantive economic or trade issues, nor have its members sought to
create a regional institution with rule-making, interpretative, enforcement or adjudicative powers. Indeed, institutionalization of APEC
through binding agreements or through the creation of a regional
body with independent interpretive or rule-making powers would be
met with strenuous opposition by many of its members.
Although APEC's future configuration and activities are at this
juncture neither fully known nor agreed upon by its members, its
goals and activities have become increasingly ambitious and far-ranging. And given the size of the APEC member economies and the economic dynamism of the' Asia-Pacific region, its evolving institutional
features as well as its substantive trade and economic agenda are matters of global economic significance. A few numbers offer perspective: APEC's 18 current member economies had a combined GDP of
U.S. $16.42 trillion in 1994, representing 53.5 percent of the world's
3
output.
Many of the analytical and scholarly treatments of APEC have
been undertaken by economists. Legal scholarship on APEC has
been more limited, perhaps because of the circumscribed role of law
in the APEC forum.4 In recent years, several diverging schools of
thought have emerged with regard to APEC's significance for regional
economic integration and what it means for the world trading system.
Some economists have argued that APEC should not evolve into
a regional free-trade agreement (FTA) because of the inherently preferential nature of free-trade arrangements and the deleterious effect
3 CF

INTRELL=ENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACr BOOK (1995).

4 Notable exceptions in this regard include: Kenneth W. Abbott & Gregory W. Bowman,
Economic Integrationfor the Asian Century:An Early Look at New Approaches, 4 TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187 (1994); Harold Dichter, Legal Implications of an Asia-Pacific Economic Grouping, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 99 (1995); Carl J. Green, APEC and Trans Pacific
Dispute Management, 26 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 719, (1995); David K. Linnan, APEC Quo
Vadis?, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 824 (1995); Rudner, supra note 2; Deborah A. Haas, Out of Others'
Shadows: ASEAN Moves Towards Greater Regional Cooperation in the Face of the EC and
Nafta, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 809 (1994).
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that the proliferation of such arrangements could well have on the
newly-formed World Trade Organization (WTO).5
Other economists have argued that even though regional arrangements are a second-best alternative to global trade liberalization,
concerns about the potentially deleterious effects of regional arrangements are not, in any event, germane to APEC. This perspective
holds that the current and any likely future configuration of APEC
offers an alternative model of regional economic cooperation, as well
as trade and investment liberalization. Such an alternative model
would produce gains for participating economies, be consistent with
multilateral rules and the WTO,6 and prove supportive of still further
multilateral trade liberalization.
Although neither the Clinton Administration nor the Bush Administration before tit concluded that APEC should become a formalized free-trade arrangement, officials have not rejected the
proposition that regional and multilateral approaches can prove
7
complementary.
5 Professor Jagdish Bhagwati argues that the proliferation of free trade agreements has already created a spaghetti bowl-like proliferation of preferential trading arrangements that detract from multilateral trade liberalization and the newly formed WTO. He argues that regional
free trade arrangements have serious economic drawbacks and are also damaging to institutional
arrangements to legitimate the world trading system. Given this perspective, he has urged Asian
members of APEC to resist U.S. or internal pressures to evolve into a free trade agreement.
Instead, APEC economies should resolve not to evolve into a free trade area, embrace an APEC
agenda that includes coordination of policies and positions at the WTO, and help to launch a
multilateral trade negotiation to reduce trade barriers on an non-discriminatory basis. See
Jagdish Bhagwati, U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuationwith Free Trade Areas, in THm DANGEROUS
DRIFr To PREFEREMTAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 1 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Anne 0. Krueger eds.,
1995).
6 See, ag., C. Fred Bergsten, APEC and World Trade: A Forcefor Worldwide Liberalization,
73 FOREIGN Asr. 20 (1994). In this article, Dr. Bergsten argues that APEC would try to achieve
regional agreement on issues that could not yet be resolved at a global level and would thereby
offer a "wholly new model of regional economic cooperation: a steady ratcheting up of trade
liberalization between the regional and, global levels that would confirm its dedication to 'open
regionalism."' Id.
7 During the Bush Administration, for example, James Baker, then Secretary of the Treasury, said: "We need to enhance the resiliency of the trading system by promoting liberalization
on a number of fronts. While we normally associate a liberal trading system with multilateralism
- bilateral or minilateral regimes may also help move the world toward a more open system."
James A. Baker, A New Trade Policy Strategyfor the United States, Address Before the Canadian
Importers Association (June 22, 1988), reprintedin 11 Tim WoRLD ECON. 215,216 (1988). Also,
Dr. Lawrence Summers, now Under Secretary of the Treasury, advanced in 1991 a proposition
that he has continued to expound as a Treasury official. Namely, that "economists should maintain a strong, but rebuttable, presumption in favor of all lateral reductions in trade barriers,
whether they be multi, uni, bi, tri or plurilateral. Global liberalization maybe best, but regional
liberalization is very likely to be good." See Lawrence H. Summers, Regionalism and the World
Trading System, in ASIA PACIFIC REGIONALISM 194, 195 (Ross Garnaut & Peter Drysdale eds.,

949

North'western Journal of
International Law & Business

17:947 (1996-97)

Much economic analyses of APEC focuses primarily on its potential to achieve liberalization of trade and investment over the medium
and long-term. Given the early stage of the APEC process, this
longer term focus is in one sense both understandable and appropriate. A long-term perspective permits scholars and analysts to propose
constructive approaches that can contribute to the discussions under
way and enhance the possibility that APEC will achieve the ambitious
goal it has set for itself of achieving free trade and investment in the
Asia-Pacific region by 2020. However, simply focusing on APEC's
long-term potential can obscure the very real obstacles that it is experiencing as it strives to implement its trade agenda.
This article provides a review and assessment of APEC. A key
issue that it addresses is APEC's current and potential future contribution to trade and investment liberalization. It will argue that
APEC's long-term trade policy goals, and the proposed methods of
achieving those goals, are objectively ambitious, procedurally unusual,
and potentially of practical value to commercial enterprises operating
in the region. APEC has also been consistent so far in its support of
the multilateral trading system embodied in the rules and principles of
the WTO.
In these respects and others, the potential long-term contribution
of APEC is very great. However, APEC has produced few concrete
results in any of its major agenda items, and fundamental issues both
of process and of substance remain unresolved by its members. Overall, this assessment of APEC advances a largely positive interpretation
of APEC as a vehicle for facilitating regional economic integration. It
is less optimistic with respect to APEC's role in fostering regional or
global trade liberalization. So far, the rhetoric of free trade in the
Asia-Pacific has outpaced the reality.
Organizationally, this article is divided into three sections. Section I examines the factors that led to APEC's formation and describes its evolution since 1989; its various ministerial and other
declarations, which are not legally binding documents but are in1994). This perspective is reflected in many recent speeches by U.S. trade officials. See, for
example, the statements of then U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, stating that "regional arrangements ... can prepare developing nations for admittance to the global trading
system ... and . . can complement global trading and lubricate negotiations." Mickey Kantor,
Global Village Gathers Speed, FmN. Tnvms, Oct. 13, 1993, at 11. The Acting U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, stated recently that "APEC compliments - and
bolsters - the World Trade Organization, as do bilateral negotiations." Ambassador Charlene
Barshefsky, Acting U.S. Trade Representative, Remarks before the Pacific Basin Economic
Council (May 21, 1996) <http:llwww.ustr.gov/speecheslbarshefsky/ barsheftsky-2.html>.
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tended to be statements of serious intent; and its self-identified goals
for the future. Section I will provide a basis for evaluating, in Section
II, APEC's current and likely future contribution to regional and
global trade and investment liberalization and facilitation. Finally,
Section III examines a number of the major analytical and policy challenges facing APEC in the years ahead.
I. APEC's EVOLUTION

A. Driving Factors
Many observers of APEC have noted that it has developed primarily in response to regional and global economic developments. At
least four related factors are important in this regard. First and foremost, APEC may be seen as a reaction to economic realities. The
growing trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region, and the intraregional economic integration this implies, is a fairly recent phenomena. Throughout the 1980's, the economies of the Asian members of
APEC grew at rates substantially higher than those of Europe and
North America. Beginning in 1986, intra-regional trade and investment came to represent the fastest growing dimension of Asia's
trade.8
A second factor that contributed to APEC's formation, and that
continues to dominate discussions at APEC meetings, is the shared
interest of its members in maintaining an open international trading
regime. The developed and developing members of APEC have been
major beneficiaries of the open trading system. Most are export-oriented economies. Therefore, the importance of access to world markets has been a recurring refrain of APEC member nations.
A third factor that has been a major influence on APEC's development is the widespread anxiety about emerging regional trading arrangements elsewhere in the world. In its early days, APEC was seen
as a needed alternative initiative in the event that regional arrangements elsewhere became inward-looking trading blocs. Indeed, it is
no coincidence that after many years of discussion about the value of
fostering an Asia-Pacific initiative in order to facilitate regional cooperation, the APEC forum got off the ground at a time when the
NAFTA negotiations were under way, when there were concerns
8 See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FuND (IMF), DIRECION OF TRADE: YEARBOOK 1995

(1995).
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about the potentially exclusionary consequences of EC-92, and when
there was a distinct possibility that the Uruguay Round would failf
A fourth factor that has dominated the attention of APEC's
members is a concern about the growing number of trade disputes
involving APEC members - especially those between the United
States, Japan, and China. All four of these factors are evident in the
review APEC's history in section B below.
B. A Review of APEC's Development 10
The following discussion traces APEC's origins and activities up
until the current time.
1.

The FirstAPEC MinisterialMeeting

The idea of an organization whose purpose it would be to facilitate economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region had postwar oigins long predating the creation of APEC." However, APEC itself
9 In January 1989, Ministers from Australia and Japan discussed the possibility of convening
a meeting of industry ministers from about 10 Asia-Pacific governments. The Australian Minister
for Industry, Commerce, and Technology was cited in Tokyo saying that "there were widespread
concerns that the two new trading blocks [E.U. and NAFTA] could develop protectionist characteristics and threaten free trade." And Senator Button was quoted as saying, "there ought to be
a greater degree of cohesion in this region to stand up to that." Earlier, Japan's Prime Minister
Takeshita and Australia's Prime Minister Hawke agreed to jointly study the likely effects of the
two trading blocks on the Asia-Pacific region. See Australia:Push for New Asia Forwn on Trade,
The Age, Jan. 30, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ASIAPC File.
10 A good overview of APEC is presented in Linnan, supra note 4.
11 Dr. Hadi Soesatro argues that the idea of Asia-Pacific cooperation had its postwar origins
in three distinct periods: from the early 1960s to around 1967, a second period from 1968 to 1977,
and the third period started in 1978, when more serious efforts were made to turn'concepts into
reality. With respect to the first period, Dr. Soesatro emphasizes the efforts of a Japanese LDP
politician name Morinosuke Kajima, as well as academic studies by Japanese economists Saburo
Okita and Kiyoshi Kojima. He notes the establishment in the early 1960s of the Japan Economic
Research Center (JERC) which issued a report proposing that annual meetings be held among
representatives from Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United States. This was
followed by a 1967 initiative from Japan's Prime Minister Sato, who endorsed the notion of a
new Asia Pacific policy for Japan. The second period reflected an internationalization of the
concept through academic circles. A series of conferences among Pacific basin economists under
an organization called Pacific Trade and Development (PAFTAD) met to actively discuss the
pros and cons of a Pacific free trade arrangement among the five developed Pacific countries. In
1972, Japan and Australia co-financed a study project conducted by JERC and Australia National University (ANU), headed by Saburo Okita and Sir John Crawford. The concept that
emerged during this period was a notion of cooperation around a loosely structured arrangement, similar to the OECD. The third period was punctuated by the interest in 1978 of Senator
John Glenn, Chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on
Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, which asked the Congressional Research Service (CRS) to
examine the feasibility of a regional economic organization. CRS, in turn, commissioned Professors Hugh Patrick, then of Yale University, and Peter Drysdale of ANU to conduct a study.
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got off the ground in no small measure because of the efforts of government officials and leaders from Australia and Japan.'"
An important juncture in APEC's institutional history occurred
in late January 1989, when then Australian Prime Minister Bob
Hawke proposed the notion of expanded Asia-Pacific economic cooperation in a speech in Seoul, Korea. 13 Prime Minister Hawke argued
that the OECD could provide a useful model and identified three
ways in which the creation of a new institution could prove useful to
further closer cooperations: (1) by improving the chances of success of
the Uruguay Round; (2) by investigating the scope for the further dismantling of barriers to trade within the region; and (3) by assisting in
identifying broad economic interests shared in common and investigating whether, through coordinated policy making regional, countries
might be able to capitalize on what, in rather hyperbolic fashion, he
called the "extraordinary complementarity" of their economies. 14
The Prime Minister's initial proposal of this Asia-Pacific initiative
did not clearly envision the participation of the United States or Canada, but rather focused on the importance of expanded efforts at regional cooperation among Australia, New Zealand, South Korea,
Japan, and the six members of the Association of Southeast Asian NaAlso in 1978, Prime Minister Ohira formed a Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group to examine
ways for enhancing regional cooperation in the Pacific. Gradually, through informal discussions
among academics, business executives, and officials in the region, an organization called PECC
was formed in 1980. See Hadi Soesatro, Pacific Economic Cooperation:The History of an Idea,
in AsIA PACIFIC REGIONAUSM, supra note 7, at 77.
12 Officials in both Australia and Japan separately undertook their own internal analyses that
focused on the possible contours of an Asia-Pacific economic organization. An important example was a study undertaken by the Government of Japan, notably the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) on prospects for cooperation in the Asia Pacific. In June 1988,
MITI's International Affairs Division completed its Interim Report, which argued that expanded
Asia-Pacific cooperation was needed, possibly through an "Asia-Pacific OECD" along with a
"soft cooperation network that will deepen mutual understanding and awareness of interdependent relationships." This network should be used to "facilitate dialogue and research," "promote mutual interest of the participating nations," and "build up gradually advancing
cooperation that gives priority to dealing with actual needs." See Asia Pacific Trade and Development Study Group, Interim Report, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, International Trade Policy Bureau, International Economic Affairs Department, MITI, June 1988.
13 At a luncheon speech in Seoul, Prime Minister Hawke said that the time had come "for us
to substantially increase our efforts towards building regional cooperation and seriously investigate what areas it might focus on and what forms it might take." See Australia: Hawke Pushes
for Regional Economic Body, THm AGE, Feb. 1, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
ASIAPC File.
14 He argued that "what we are seeking to develop is a capacity for analysis and consultation
on economic and social issues, not as an academic exercise but to help inform policy development and by our respective governments." Id.
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tions (ASEAN). Officials in Japan greeted the Australian initiative

with enthusiasm but insisted on the inclusion of the United States.' 5
The first regional meeting of trade and foreign ministers was convened in November 1989 in Canberra, Australia. Officials from 12
countries were present at that meeting. 16 It produced little in the way
of a clearly defined mission, agreement on future membership, or
APEC's structure or activities. 17 Let us examine each of these dimensions in turn.

As to its mission, this first meeting was used primarily to reaffirm
the commitment of the ministers to the preservation of the multilat-

eral trading system and the importance of the timely conclusion of the
Uruguay Round.' The ministers also agreed on broad areas that
should be the focus of future work programs. 19

As to structure, prior to the meeting, the members of the
ASEAN had opposed Prime Minister Hawke's initial concept of an
OECD-type organization in the Asia-Pacific. This notion did not
emerge from the meetings. ASEAN representatives also were concerned that the forum might undermine ASEAN's role. Senior offi15 Press reports indicate that Japan's Prime Minister Takeshita wrote Prime Minister Hawke
in March of 1989 supporting the Seoul plan. In April of that year, Hawke sent a senior Australian diplomat, Dick Woolcott on a series of talks throughout Asia concerning the proposed
grouping and its draft agenda. See Japan Economic Newsire, Nov. 5, 1989, availablein LEXIS,
Nexis Library, ASIAPC File; see generally Yoic-n FUNABASHI, ASIA PAcIFIc FUSION: JAPAN'S
RoLE IN APEc (1995).

16 The twelve countries represented included: Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea,
the United States, Canada and the Asean members of Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia,
The Philippines and Brunei.
17 Prime Minister Hawke said that the meeting represented an "unprecedented, vital experiment in international consultation," and was an "initial exploratory meeting" taken in order to
discuss the challenges faced by the countries represented at the meeting. See Misuk Woo, Hawke
callsfor Mechanism for Pacific Co-Prosperity,Japan Economic Newswire, Nov. 5, 1989, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ASIAPC File. The Prime minister further stressed that "we do not
meet here today with any hidden agenda to create some form of Pacific trading bloc." See
Florence Chung, Australia: ASEAN Ministers Broadly Agree on a Common Strategy, Bus.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 1989, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, ASIAPC File.
18 In an interview after the meeting, then-U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Hills said
"the Ministers, to a person, agreed that their economic success was a result of the open trading
system that they had all enjoyed and if there was one thing that came through in the conference
it was unanimous support for the Uruguay Round negotiations." See Steve Burrell, Australia
APEC Nations to Present United Frott on Trade Issues, Aus-R. FIN. REv., Nov. 8, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ASIAPC File.
19 The ministers agreed to initiate two projects in the near term on regional trade data and
mechanisms so as to facilitate trade, investment, and technology-transfer opportunities in the
region. They identified broad areas for future working including economic studies, trade liberalization, investment and sectoral cooperation. See CRAImAN's SUMMARY STATEMENT, APEc
MINISTERIAL MEETING JoINT STATEMENT (Nov. 6, 1989) <http'l www.apec.org> [hereinafter
CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARY STATEMENT].
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cials at the meeting stated that APEC was not designed "to launch a
new institution but is a process of cooperation."2 0 It was agreed that
APEC would be characterized as a "process" complementary to, but
not competitive with ASEAN. It was agreed that APEC would be "a
nonformal forum for consultation among high-level representatives of
significant economies in the Asia-Pacific region."'" It was further
agreed that it was "premature to decide upon any particular structure
for a Ministerial-level forum... but that while ideas were evolving it
was both appropriate and valuable for further consultative meetings
to take place and for work to be undertaken on matters of common
interest and concern."22
The meeting did not produce agreement on future membership,
the key issue at the time being the representation from the People's
Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, and Hong Kong.' However, the
Ministers agreed to hold further meetings and to re-examine the issue
the participants
of membership.24 Although the results were modest,
25
were enthusiastic about the group's prospects.
2.

The Singapore Ministerial

The second meeting of APEC members occurred on July 29-31,
1990, in Singapore. Here again the chief focus of the meeting was on
the Uruguay Round. 26 The Singapore Ministerial also agreed to undertake a number of work projects and to "keep under review" the
question of additional members being added to the APEC process.27
20 Misuk Woo, APEC to Launch Work Programfor Cooperation, Nov. 6, 1989, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, ASIAPC File.
21 David Clark Scott, Asia Pacific Economic Organization Takes Shape, CnUSIAN Sc.
MONITOR, Nov. 9, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ASIAPC File.
22 CIARmiAN's SUMMARY STATEMENT, supra note 19.

23 Preceding the meeting there was some discussion of including the PRC, Hong Kong, and
Taiwan at some point in the process but not at the initial meeting.
24 A second meeting was to be held in Singapore in 1990 and a third in South Korea in 1991,
which were to be preceded by meetings of senior officials. See CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARY STATEMENT, supra note 19.
25 Secretary of State Baker said that the meeting produced a "very clear and substantial step
forward toward the improvement of international economic relations generally." See C-AmMAN'S SUMMARY STATEMENT,

supra note 19.

26 The Ministerial Declaration from Singapore stated that "the primary objective of APEC
this year was to ensure a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round." See APEC Ministerial
Joint Statement (July 1990) <http'/www.apec.org>.
27 The projects included a review of trade and investment data, trade promotion, expansion
of investment, and technology transfer in the Asia-pacific region, human resource development
initiative, regional energy cooperation, marine resource conservation, and telecommunications.
Id.
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3. The Seoul Ministerial
The third meeting of the APEC ministers, which occurred in Seoul, Korea in November 1991 was important in three respects. First,
regarding the issue of membership, the Minister's agreed that participation in APEC should "be open in principle," and that future participants would be decided upon by consensus. Moreover, due in
significant measure to the efforts of Korea, this meeting of APEC included the PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (called Chinese-Taipei) as
members of APEC, thus becoming the first international governmental forum at which all three entities were included as participants.
Second, with respect to APEC's goals and mission, the ministers issued the "Seoul Declaration" which represented the clearest articulation as of that time of the goals for the APEC forum.28 It was at the
Seoul meetings that a core concept of APEC, namely the idea of
"open regionalism" began to take shape. Third, the Seoul meetings
took a few steps forward in institutionalizing the APEC forum. 29 To
this end, the ministers agreed to formalize the APEC process through
annual ministerial meetings, to task senior officials to meet at various
intervals between ministerial meetings in order to develop the APEC
process, and to further develop working groups to undertake each
identified work program. Three additional work projects on fisheries,
transportation, and tourism were added, thereby bringing the total to
ten projects. The Ministers also considered the option of inviting a
group of eminent persons to "consider the likely shape of trade in the
Asia-Pacific over the medium term, and to identify constraints and
issues that would need to be addressed by governments in order to
realise the potential for trade in the region."30
As in Singapore, the ministers issued a separate statement on the
importance of the Uruguay Round.31
28 The Declaration stated that the objectives of APEC should be fourfold: "to sustain the
growth and development of the region...; to enhance the positive gains resulting from increasing
economic inter-dependence... ; to develop and strengthen the open multilateral trading system.. .; to reduce barriers to trade in goods and services and investment among participants in a
manner consistent with GATT principles, where applicable, and without detriment to other
economies." See Seoul Apec Declaration(Nov. 14, 1991) <http://www.apecsec.org.sg>.
29 President Roh Tae Woo, in his keynote address to the ministers, emphasized that APEC
had "reached a stage where an institutional base should be established in order to represent the
common economic interests of the region and to promote the intra-regional trade and economic
cooperation." See APEC Ministerial Meeting Joint Statement Nov. 14, 1991, availablein LEXIS,
Nexis Library, ASIAPC File.
30 Id. 117.
31 Id. at Annex C.
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4.

The Bangkok Ministerial

The fourth APEC Ministerial was held in Bangkok in September
1992. The United States was in the midst of a presidential election
and did not send any ministerial-level officials to the meeting. The
Japanese and Canadian foreign ministers also did not attend.32 Nonetheless at the Bangkok meeting, the members agreed to expand the
membership from 15 to 17 by including Mexico and Papua New
Guinea. It also was agreed that APEC should create a permanent,
albeit slim secretariat in Singapore, with a U.S. $2 million a year annual budget that would be financed proportionally by APEC members. The activities and authority of the secretariat were defined very
narrowly. It had no central decision-making powers. The Bangkok
Ministerial also advanced certain programmatic features of the APEC
process.3 3 Once again, the ministers issued a separate statement on
the importance of a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round.
5.

The Seattle APEC Meetings

The first report of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) preceded
the Seattle APEC Ministerial.3 4 This 1993 EPG Report and its two
subsequent reports became important vehicles for the debate and articulation of different concepts and approaches to regional economic
cooperation.
The first EPG Report contained recommendations in four areas.
First, with respect to trade liberalization, the 1993 EPG Report recommended both global and regional initiatives. In terms of global initiatives, it endorsed the successful completion of the Uruguay Round
by the end of 1993, urged APEC members to seek agreement by the
GATT contracting parties to launch the next major global negotiation
by the end of 1995, argued that the GAT should create a wise-persons group to recommend a specific course of action for the next
32 See FuNABAsm, supra note 15, at 77.

33 The 1992 APEC Ministerial documents also officially called for the establishment of an
Eminent Persons Group (EPG), comprised of prominent individuals from each of the APEC
member economies. The initial concept of the EPG was that it should develop a "vision for trade
in the Asia Pacific region to the year 2000, identify constraints and issues which should be considered by APEC" and report to the next ministerial. It also issued progress reports on the
work underway in the various work programs and tasked the Senior Officials to identify ways to
engage the private sector more fully into the APEC Work Projects." APEC Fourth Ministerial
Meeting, Joint Statement para. 14, 18, 26 (Sept. 11, 1992) <http://www.apecsec.org.sg>.
34 See Report Of The Eminent Persons Group, A Vision For APEC: Towards An Asia Pacific Economic Community, APEC Doc. No. 93-EP-01 (Oct. 1993) [hereinafter 1993 EPG
Report].
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round of multilateral trade negotiations, and called for the tightening
of rules governing regional arrangements.
For regional initiatives, it argued that APEC should set a goal of
free trade in the Asia-Pacific inclusive of some areas not fully covered
by GATT disciplines - e.g., with respect to issues such as the environment, competition policy, and services. It called upon the APEC
members to agree in 1996 on the target date and timetable for the
achievement of free trade in the region
and to thereby create "a true
35
Asia-Pacific Economic community.
Second, in an effort to kick-off the process of achieving these
broad goals, the 1993 EPG Report recommended that the members
launch a vigorous trade and investment facilitation program. 6
Third, the Report urged the members to undertake a program
aimed at expanding technical cooperation..7 And fourth, it called for
further, albeit "modest" steps to institutionalize the APEC process.38
The Seattle meetings of APEC occurred just days after the prolonged and difficult vote in the United States on the NAFTA, some 25
days before the deadline for the conclusion of the Uruguay Round,
and at a time of difficult bilateral tensions between the United States

35 Id. at 8.
36 Specific proposals focused on the creation of an APEC investment code; a new disputesettlement mechanism for the region; the initiation of regular meetings of officials responsible
for macroeconomic and monetary polices; expanded cooperation on competition policy and environmental policy; and harmonization or mutual recognition of standards in key sectors such as
telecommunications and air transport. The specific elements of the facilitation program identified by the EPG included: adopt an Asia Pacific Investment Code, develop an effective dispute
settlement mechanism, hold regular meetings between ministers and officials responsible for
macroeconomic and monetary policy; assess alternative approaches to competition policy; adopt
a medium term objective of mutual recognition of product standards and mutually acceptable
domestic testing and monitoring procedures for standards in selected priority industries such as
telecommunications and aviation safety; consult on environmental policies; address rules of origin; and consult to find ways of preventing rules of origin from becoming new sources of uncertainty. Id.
37 In the area of technical cooperation, the 1993 EPG Report recommended further development of public infrastructure such as higher education, transportation and telecommunication
networks, and energy facilities. Id.
38 On this point, the 1993 Report argued that the process required the even more active
involvement of economic, finance, trade, and industry ministers; hold regular informal leaders
meetings, support the institutional structure of the APEC Secretariat, and take on collective
financial responsibility in recruiting and paying for its substantive staff. In the summary remarks
of the Chairman of the EPG, he stressed that the report was proposing the creation neither of
another European Community nor the creation of an Asia-Pacific free trade area. See C. Fred
Bergsten, Summary of the Report of the Eminent Persons Group, APEC Fifth Ministerial Meeting, Nov. 18, 1993.
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and China and the United States and Japan.39 These meetings were a
milestone in APEC's history.
Most importantly, the Seattle meetings §erved to elevate APEC
meetings to the highest level. President Clinton invited all 17 APEC
leaders to Blake Island, Washington for an informal Asia-Pacific summit following upon the heels of the APEC Ministerial. Although
China insisted that Taiwan's President not be invited and Malaysia's
Prime Minister Mahathir refused to attend,4" 15 heads of government
were in attendance. The informal summit was the first such meeting
of all of the Asia-Pacific leaders.4 '
The Clinton initiative started a pattern of Leaders' Meetings,
which have since accompanied every subsequent APEC Ministerial.42
As a result, the undertakings made in APEC have come to be directly
associated with the heads of government and particularly with the
leader hosting the meeting. Although U.S. officials stressed that the
"meeting was the message,"'43 the Seattle meetings were not entirely
devoid of substance. Papua New Guinea and Mexico were added as
members to APEC. More importantly, President Clinton, echoing a
theme in the 1993 EPG report, called for the creation of a "community" of Asia-Pacific economies.
Neither the Leader's statements nor the Ministerial releases
picked up on the recommendation contained in the 1993 EPG Report
that the APEC Ministers agree on a specific timetable for achieving
39 The House vote approving NAFTA was on November 17, 1993, the Senate vote occurred
on November 20, 1993. The APEC Ministerial meetings were held on November 17-19, 1993,
and the Leader's meeting occurred on November 20, 1993. The final deadline for the Uruguiay
Round was December 15, 1993.
40 Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir boycotted the meetings, doubtless unhappy with the
negative response of the U.S. Government to his idea of creating a separate group, the East
Asian Economic Group (EAEG) which excluded the United States and Canada. He allegedly
saw this U.S. opposition as part of a U.S.plot to dominate the APEC process. See Clay Chandler,
Trade Focus Shifting from Europeto Asik Clinton Seeks to Send Message at Summit, WASH. POST,
Nov. 17, 1993, at G1.
41 Many of the Asian participants were concerned that the U.S. would dominate the proceedings and announce a trade liberalization initiative at APEC without sufficient vetting or
agreement among the Asian participants before the initiative was announced. As it turned out,
no such U.S. initiative was unveiled at the meetings. President Clinton seemed to go out of his
way to stress that the APEC Leaders Meeting was focused on "getting acquainted and on sharing perspectives." See William J. Clinton, Remarks to Seattle APEC Host Committee, 2 Pub.
Papers 2013, 2019 (1993).
42 The terminology of "Leaders' Meetings" as against summits was selected to accommodate
the different status of representatives from the PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
43 A senior U.S. official, Robert R. Rubin, was quoted as saying that the "meeting is the
message." R.W. Apple Jr., Godfather to Pacific Era Clinton Succeeds by Merely Getting Asians
to Meet, N.Y. Tmrms, Nov. 21, 1993, at Al.
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free trade in the region.' Once again, the ministers issued a declaration on the Uruguay Round. This declaration contained more specificity than earlier statements and was more important, coming as it did
on the eve of the final deadline of the Uruguay Round.45 It identified
numerous tariff items where APEC members committed to undertake
additional actions. This initiative by APEC often is credited with giving a much-needed boost to the Uruguay Round. Other additions to
the APEC agenda were fairly limited and largely programmatic. 6
6. The Jakarta Ministerialand Bogor Leader's Meeting
Prior to the APEC meetings in Indonesia, the EPG issued its second report.47 This report warrants attention because it brought to the
surface the underlying tensions within APEC regarding the nature of
and methodology for achieving liberalization of trade within the region. In terms of broad goals, the 1994 EPG Report recommended
the goal of 2020 as the target date for full trade liberalization in the
region.
The 1994 EPG Report also tried to more fully explicate the concept of "open regionalism." As noted above, APEC Ministers had
consistently argued that although the APEC process was a regional
initiative it should not develop the inward-looking and trade diverting
features negatively associated with regional arrangements. Instead,
44 See APEC Leaders Economic Vision Statement (Nov. 20, 1993) <http://
www.apecsec.org.sg>; APEC Fifth MinisterialMeeting, Joint Statement (Nov. 20, 1993) <http://
www.apecsec.org.sg>.
45 For example, the statement on the Uruguay Round supported the GATT Director General's draft "Final Act" as the basis for the final agreement, agreed to match commitments made
by the Quad countries, to move further on non tariff barriers, and to accelerate work in bilateral
negotiations. A detailed statement was released by APEC members itemizing the sectors where
they were prepared to offer additional commitments. See Statement by APEC Members Participating in the Uruguay Round (November 1993).
46 The U.S. government called for and reached support among the participants for meetings
between finance ministers; the formation of an Asia Pacific business roundtable; and the establishment of an Asia Pacific Education Foundation. In addition, the APEC work program expanded and an APEC Trade and Investment Committee was established to explore ways that
APEC members could improve the flow of goods, services, investment, and technology across
the region. The work program of the Trade and Investment Committee included: trade policy
dialogue, customs simplification and harmonization efforts, examination of investment environment, a regional tariff data base and manual, examination of administrative measures affecting
trade in the region, defining APEC's possible roles in standards, examination of the issues affecting small and medium size enterprises; review the results of the Uruguay Round for the region,
and addressed certain other issues recommended by the EPG. See generallyAPEC Fifth Ministerial Meeting, supra note 44.
47 Cf. APEC EMINENT PERSONS GROUP, AcIEvING Tmn APEC VISION: FREE AND OPEN
TRADE IN m ASIA PACIIC 54-55 (APEC Doe. 94-EP-01-1994) [hereinafter the 1994 EPG
REPORT].
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APEC should maintain its principle of "open regionalism" and ensure
that whatever occurred within the APEC context would be made
available not only to the APEC members but to the global economy.'
Broad agreement on that point notwithstanding, the 1993 EPG Report as well as the preceding APEC declarations had left unanswered
how the process should unfold and how open regionalism should be
operationalized.
The 1994 EPG report offered an approach to trade liberalization
in the region that essentially left all options open to participating
members. Specifically, it proposed four non-mutually exclusive approaches. First, the pursuit of unilateral trade liberalization that countries might choose to pursue on their own. Second, a commitment to
the lowering of trade and investment barriers to non-APEC countries.
Third, the ability of APEC members to extend any benefits of liberalization to nonmembers who were willing to accept similar obligations
toward APEC members - for example, on a mutually reciprocal basis.
And fourth, the extension of liberalization to nonmembers on either a
conditional (through free trade arrangements) or an unconditional basis (to all nonmembers on an most favored nation (MFN) basis). 49
Of these options, the fourth option is especially controversial because it preserved the possibility that APEC would evolve into a formal trading arrangement within the meaning of Article 24 of the
GATT, or it would violate GATT's MFN principle. 5° This menu of
options reflects the lack of consensus within the EPG itself as well as
APEC about the precise manner in which countries should liberalize
in the years ahead.
The Leader's Meeting, hosted by Indonesia's President Suharto,
produced an important declaration with respect to the long-term goal
48 As noted by Robert Z. Lawrence, to the degree that outsiders would be permitted to gain
from any preferential arrangements so long as they were prepared to join on the same basis as
those participating in the arrangement, this would provide outsiders "with a ready means for
mitigating any trade diversion." See Robert Z. Lawrence, Regionalism and the WTO: Should
the Rules be Changes?, June 24, 1996 (unpublished paper prepared for the Institute for International Economics Conference on "The World Trading System: Challenges Ahead," on file with
M. Janow).

49 The MFN principle contained in Article 1 of the GATi is a basic non-discrimination principle that provides that any concession made by one country to another must be extended unconditionally and immediately to like products originating from other Contracting parties.
50 Under Article 24 of the GATr, customs unions and free trade area agreements are permitted an exception to the principle of non-discrimination because "it is recognized that such
agreements have the potential to further economic integration without necessarily adversely affecting the interests of third countries." See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, REGIONAusM
AND TaE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 8 (1995).
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of the APEC process. 51 In the "APEC Economic Leader's Declaration of Common Resolve in Bogor" (the Bogor Declaration), the
leaders agreed to "adopt the long-term goal of free and open trade
and investment in Asia Pacific."'52 The Bogor Declaration stated that
this goal "will be pursued promptly by further reducing barriers to
trade and investment and by promoting the free flow of goods, services, and capital among our economies" through GATr-consistent
steps. It was agreed that free trade and investment in the Asia Pacific
should be achieved by "no later than 2020." 53 A variable-speed approach to implementation of this objective was adopted in order to
"take into account the differing levels of economic development
among APEC economies, with the industrialized economies achieving
the goal of free and open trade and investment no later than the year
2010 and developing economies no later than the year 2020." 54
Here again, the goal was not to achieve a free trade agreement by
a certain date, but rather to achieve free trade itself in the region by
no later than 2020 for one group of countries and 2010 for another.
The Bogor Declaration did not identify which countries fit into each
category. It was assumed generally that the industrial countries expected to meet the 2010 timeline included the United States, Japan,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Later, both Singapore and Taiwan volunteered to meet the 2010 deadline. It was generally assumed
that China, Thailand, the Philippines,
Indonesia, and Malaysia would
55
be held to the 2020 standard.
As in the case of the EPG Report, the Bogor Declaration did not
identify how this broad goal would be operationalized, nor did it clarify how non-APEC members would be treated. The former issue was
stated for the subsequent Osaka meeting, the latter remains unresolved. In this sense, the operational issues that surfaced in the 1994
51 Trade and Foreign Ministers from APEC met on November 11-12 in Jakarta, followed by
a Leaders meeting on November 15th in Bogor, this time with Prime Minister Mahathir in
attendance.
52 APEC Economic Leaders' Declaration of Common Resolve, para 6 (Nov. 15, 1994)
<http'I/www.apecsec.org.sg> [hereinafter Bogor Declaration].
53 Id.
54 Id

55 Malaysia's Prime Minister initially asserted that he did not consider the timetable binding,
since the proposal was delivered to the leaders without proper vetting at the level of senior
officials. He later introduced the caveat that it was unclear where Malaysia would fit by 2020.
See Jane Khanna, Asia Pacific Ecomomic Cooperationand Challenges for PoliticalLeadership,
19 WASH Q. 1, 255 (1996). Some trade analysts have questioned whether it is fully appropriate
to include all of China in the 2020 timetable. They note that some parts of China, such as
Guangzhou and Shanghai, will be industrial areas in 2010. Gary C. Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott,
Toward Free Trade and Investment in the Asia-Pacific, 10 WASH Q. 37 (1995).
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EPG Report were largely papered over in the subsequent APEC
meetings.
Despite these unanswered questions, a second defining feature of
the Bogor Declaration was the fairly unequivocal language in the
Declaration that committed the leaders to liberalization in a manner
that would strengtjen global trade and investment liberalization.
Thus, the Bogor Declaration states that "the outcome of trade and
investment liberalization in Asia Pacific will not only be the actual
reduction of barriers among APEC economies but also between
'5 6
APEC economies and non-APEC economies.
The self-defined mission of the APEC forum was not limited to
trade liberalization alone; the Leader's placed "co-equal emphasis" on
trade facilitation, cooperation, and liberalization. To this end, the
Bogor Declaration called upon APEC ministers to submit facilitation
proposals on APEC arrangements on "customs, standards, investment
principles and administrative barriers to market access;" 57 and to expand cooperative activities in the areas of human resource development; cooperation in science and technology; the development of
APEC study centers; measures to promote small and medium scale
enterprises; and steps to improve economic infrastructure such as energy, transportation, information, telecommunications, and tourism. 58
The leaders directed their ministers to begin preparing detailed proposals for implementing these broad decisions. 9
A final product of the APEC Ministerial meeting was a set of
non-binding investment principles that had been developed by the
APEC Committee on Trade and Investment (CTI) 6 ° The United
States initially pressed the APEC members to agree on binding principles; however, it failed to achieve consensus within APEC on this
point. The principles announced in Indonesia were strictly non-bind56 Bogor Declaration, supra note 52, 16.
57 Bogor Declaration, supranote 52, 17.
58 Bogor Declaration, supra note 52, 8.
59 The Bogor Declaration also called for certain limited institutional developments. Specifically, the Leaders agreed "to examine the possibility of a voluntary consultative dispute mediation service to supplement the WTO dispute settlement mechanism." Id., 9. And, the Leaders
asked the two outside advisory groups in the form of the EPG and the PBF to continue for
another year and to review the relationship between APEC and existing subregional arrangements. Bogor Declaration, supra note 52, 11.
60 U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor characterized the non-binding principles as an
"initial step" which would require additional improvement especially with respect to national
treatment, performance and repatriation. See Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary
of Commerce Ron Brown and Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, Press Conference at the
Jakarta Convention Center, Nov. 12, 1994 (transcript available in Press Conference U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman).
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ing and, thus, were designed not to prejudice existing international
instruments such as bilateral investment treaties or other multilateral
instruments such as the investment related provisions in the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) accord.6 '
7.

The Osaka Ministerialand Leader's Meeting

The Seventh APEC Ministerial and the Third Leader's meeting
was hosted in Osaka, Japan on November 16-19, 1995. Following the
Bogor Declaration and its ambitious statement regarding APEC's
long term goal of free trade in the region, Japan as the host of the
meetings was under considerable pressure to produce a blue print detailing the steps that APEC members would need to take if free trade
in the region was to become a reality.
The 1995 EPG Report which preceded the APEC meetings
stressed that the APEC economies should provide a "downpayment"
at Osaka that would demonstrate their commitment to implement the
Bogor Declaration on free trade and investment. To this end, it argued that acceleration of Uruguay Round commitments would represent an important form of a downpayment that should be made on an
most-favored nation (MFN) basis and subject to what it called a "fifty
percent rule." 62
As to this point, the 1995 EPG Report emphasized that APEC
members should "reduce by half the transition period for implementing trade liberalization and rule-making reforms that they have already committed to in the Uruguay Round."6 3 Most of the other
areas of the 1995 EPG Report argued for movement on steps identified in previous EPG reports.' 4
61 See Bijit Bora & Monty Graham, Non-binding Investment Principles in APEC,in PRiORTY
ISSUES IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT LiBERAUZATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ASIA-PACIPIC
176-89 (Bijit Bora & Mari Pangestu eds., 1996).
62 APEC EMINENT PERSONS GROUP, IMPLEMENTING THE APEC VISION (1995) <http:/l
www.apecsec.org.sg/epg95.html> [hereinafter the 1995 EPG REPORT].

63 The 1995 EPG Report suggested that industrialized countries accelerate their commitments in the three areas of tariffs, agriculture, and textiles. Developing economies should "commit to gradually reduce the gap between their bound tariff rates and their currently applied
rates," and to reduce transition periods with respect to nontariff items such as those featured in
the Trade Related Intellectual Property (TRIPS), Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)
and subsidy areas. ld.

64 Examples include: addressing problems associated with abuse of antidumping policies; cooperation between member economy authorities in implementing their present competition policies; strengthening-nonbinding investment principles and applying them in practice; adopting a
multifaceted program for product standards and testing; concentrating governmental efforts on
working out Mutual Recognition Agreements on acceptance of test data and product certification in major regulated sectors; installing an APEC dispute mediation service to cover those
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The Osaka Ministerial and Leader's meetings lacked some of the

prominence of the Bogor and Seattle meetings that had preceded
them. This is not wholly surprising, given that the challenge at Osaka
was not to design a visionary framework for APEC's future but rather
to produce a workable framework to guide the implementation of the
Bogor Declaration on free trade in the region by 2010/2020. In addi-

tion, there was an unexpected development that probably had some
impact on the meetings. At the last moment, President Clinton was
unable to attend the meetings because of a budgetary impasse in
United States.65
The Osaka APEC meetings produced a document containing an
"Action Agenda" designed to implement the Bogor Declaration. 66 It

emphasized the three "co-equal" pillars of liberalization, facilitation,
and cooperation. 67 This represents not only the various components
of the APEC agenda, but the now long-embedded tension between
the APEC members as to whether APEC should also be viewed as a

consultative forum or a negotiating forum for addressing trade liberalizing measures.
The Action Agenda laid out principles that are to guide APEC as

it strives to achieve free trade and investment in the region by 2020/
2010, an overall agenda for subsequent implementation, a timetable
for action, a unique modality for advancing the APEC process, and an
initial set of unilateral measures intended to serve as the Osaka
"downpayment." The Action Agenda also identified those substan-

tive areas that would be the subject of future liberalization - some
fifteen of them.68 Some of these are familiar subjects that have been
disputes not covered by the WTO or other international arrangements; pursuing further liberalization of subregional trading arrangements only within the principles of open regionalism; deepening its cooperation on monetary and macroeconomic issues. Id.
65 See Jurek Martin, No Thne for Clinton to Quit Budget Barricades,FrN. TIMES, Nov. 17,
1995, at 4, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS file. This article quotes President Clinton as saying: "if people who work for the federal government aren't working and the people
who need the services of our government aren't getting them, it's going to be difficult to see my
way through taking this trip." Id.
66 The two major documents that came out of the Osaka meetings were: APEC Economic
Leaders' Declaration of Common Resolve (Nov. 19, 1995) <http://www.apecsec.org.sg
7thmin.html> and APEC Ministerial Meeting Joint Statement (Nov. 16-17, 1995) <http://
www.apecsec.org.sglosaka.html> [hereinafter Action Agenda].
67 See Action Agenda, supra note 66.
68 The target areas included: tariffs, non-tariff measures (NTBs), services (notably transportation, telecommunications, energy, and tourism), investment, standards and conformance, customs procedures, intellectual property rights, competition policy, government procurement,
deregulation, rules of origin, dispute mediation, mobility of business persons, implementation of
Uruguay Round outcomes, and information gathering and analysis. Id. at Part 1 (10).
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addressed to varying degrees in multilateral rounds of trade negotiations - for example, tariffs and non-tariff measures. Other areas of
identified liberalization are only marginally covered by multilateral
disciplines or, in some instances, are not subject to any established
multilateral rules. Notable examples of the former include services
and investment; examples of the latter include deregulation and competition policy.
The Action Agenda identified 13 areas in which APEC members
would pursue economic and technical cooperation.69 It also advanced
a unique modality for implementing the Bogor vision through socalled "concerted unilateral actions, collective actions and multilateral
actions. 7 ° Certain collective actions and the first set of "Individual
Action Plans" (IAPs) were contained in the document, with the understanding that more substantial IAPs were to be submitted at the
1996 APEC meetings the Philippines, with implementation to begin in
January 1997.
& The Manila Ministerialand Leader's Meetings
The main tasks of the Eighth APEC Ministerial and the Fourth
Leader's meetings held in Manila in November 1996 were twofold:
first, to produce individual and collective action plans that demonstrated the commitment of the APEC members to the Bogor free
trade vision; and second, to provide substantive momentum for further global trade liberalization on the eve of the December 1996 meeting of the first WTO Ministerial in Singapore.
The tone of the meetings in Manila were very positive. Overall,
however, the meetings produced small steps forward on both of the
two main tasks referenced above. Indeed, the high points of the 1996
APEC meetings included several prominent bilateral meetings between President Clinton and leaders from South Korea, the PRC and
Japan. With respect to regional initiatives, the Manila meetings produced a lengthy Action Plan for APEC 1996, dubbed MAPA '96,
which details collective and individual actions plans, but this document contains few major new liberalization initiatives.7 And
'69 These included: human resource development; industrial science and technology; small
and medium enterprises; economic infrastructure; energy; transportation; telecommunications
and information infrastructure; tourism; trade and investment data; trade promotion; marine
resource conservation; fisheries; and agricultural technology. Id. at Part I(10).
70 See id. at Part (9).
71 Indeed, improving and agreeing upon a shared methodology for the format of the IAP
documents in order to facilitate comparisons across economies and changes over time are important tasks that APEC economies need to consider more fully.
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although there were some procedural improvements in the format of
the individual action plans, the diverse and non-uniform nature of the
undertakings contained in the action plans makes a precise overall
comparative assessment of the plans difficult. The Ministerial Declaration announced at APEC acknowledged the contribution of the action plans as a "credible beginning to the process of liberalization."'7 2
The Ministerial Declaration also referenced the work underway in the
various working groups or joint activities, reaffirmed the commitment
of the Ministers to achieving the Bogor goals, and stressed the importance of the upcoming WTO Ministerial. In addition, although the
APEC Economic Leaders' Declaration suggests that much was accomplished at the meetings, like the Ministerial Declaration, it contains few additional specific undertakings.73
As discussed in greater detail below in the assessment of APEC,
with respect to global trade liberalization, the Leader's Declaration
contained a broad reference to the conclusion of an Information Technology Agreement (ITA) at the WTO. The significance of that ITA
reference was far from clear at the time it was announced since it was
almost immediately undermined by open disagreement among the
APEC countries about the meaning of the reference. However, several weeks later at the December meeting of the WTO, an information technology agreement was ultimately announced, and it appears
that the APEC endorsement was helpful to this process.
II. AN EARLY ASSESSMENT OF APEC
This section offers an interim assessment of the APEC forum. It
is intended to highlight APEC's accomplishments and to identify its
actual and potential limitations. Specifically, this discussion examines
APEC's contribution to global and regional trade liberalization (in
sections A, B & C below), APEC's efforts in the area of trade facilitation (in section D), and the broader aspects of APEC's institutional
72 See ASIA-PACIFC ECONOnC COOPERATION MINISTEmIAL JoIr STATEMENT 11 (Nov.
22-23, 1996) <http.//www.apec.sec.org>.

73 The Leader's Declaration states that this process has "launched the implementation phase
of our free and open trade and investment agenda, delivered business facilitation measures,
agreed to advance common goals in the World Trade Organization, developed ways to
strengthen economic and technical cooperation, and engaged the business sector as a full partner
in the APEC process." See APEC Economic Leaders' Declaration, From Vision to Action:
SubicPhilippines, 3 (Nov. 25, 1996) <http://www.apec.sec.org> [hereinafter Leaders' Declaration]. Specific commitments referenced in the Leader's Declaration included a 1997 review of
the IAPs, an CAP undertaking to harmonize tariff nomenclature by the end of the year, and
customs clearance procedures by 1998, and intensification of work in 1997 on customs cleareance
procedures and other business facilitation measures. Id 19.
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future and potential contribution to regional economic integration
and policy coordination (in sections E and F).
A. APEC as a Forum for Global Trade Liberalization
The APEC forum has repeatedly emphasized the importance that
it attaches to multilateral trade liberalization and WTO-consistent liberalization within APEC. Three specific areas are considered to examine whether, and how, this rhetorical emphasis has been borne out
in APEC's actual trade initiatives: (1) commitments within the APEC
to implement or accelerate Uruguay Round liberalization commitments in general, and reductions in tariff bindings in particular; (2) the
negotiating positions of APEC countries with regard to multilateral
negotiations on liberalization of services' notably basic telecommunication services; and (3) APEC's position on the Information Technology Agreement.
Tariff reductions are reviewed because steps taken or not taken in
this area are concrete and well understood; this is the standard grist
for the trade negotiator's mill. The second area, services, represent
frontier issues in multilateral trade negotiations. The Uruguay Round
is the first multilateral trade negotiation to introduce any disciplines
on services, and these were only modest. The third and most recent
development that offers a perspective on APEC's role in promoting
further global trade liberalization is the reference to the information
technology agreement contained in the Manila Leader's Declaration.
1.

Acceleration of Uruguay Round Commitments 'and Tariff
Reductions

As noted in Section I above, every APEC Ministerial or Leader's
Meeting has placed great emphasis on ensuring global access to markets and on the preservating and enhancing the WTO system. At the
Seattle Summit, APEC's support for multilateral trade liberalization
served as a concrete boost to the Uruguay Round negotiations, as
APEC members identified those areas in which they were prepared to
undertake additional tariff concessions. Such undertakings have been
credited with successfully widening the scope of the tariff commitments offered in the final days of the Uruguay Round and thereby
serving to jolt the Europeans into taking the additional steps that
helped to bring the Round to a close.74 And when the Uruguay
74 Indeed, following the Seattle summit, European leaders became concerned that APEC
had the potential to become a regional trade arrangement excluding them. One analysis has said
that the upgrading of the APEC meetings at Seattle was "a cheap way of reassuring the Asia
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Round did come to a close, all of the APEC countries that were members of the GATT ratified the Uruguay Round Final Act by Decem-

ber of 1994.75 Since the Uruguay Round's conclusion, the emphasis
on multilateralism and WTO-consistency within APEC has remained
76
strong.

The very concept of "open regionalism" hinges on the notion that
APEC undertakings will be consistent with multilateral rules. In fact,
the Bogor Declaration went beyond mere consistency with WTO dis-

ciplines, and it endorsed the notion of acceleration of Uruguay Round
commitments. This approach also has been stressed by APEC's various advisory groups such as the EPG and the Pacific Business Forum.
Concrete measures by APEC members to accelerate the implementation of Uruguay Round commitments are still at an early stage.
The initial Individual Action Plans announced at Osaka contain a
number of initial commitments to accelerate Uruguay Round Com-

mitments.7 7 The Manila meetings provided another test of whether
Pacific countries that the Untied States intended to remain engaged in the region, while simultaneously signalling to the Europeans that if they continued to allow French farmers to hold up the
Uruguay Round, other countries might be prepared to proceed with increased economic integration without them." See Jeffrey A. Frankel et al., APEC and Regional TradingArrangements in
the Pacific, Working Paper Series, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 94-1 (1994).
75 This amounts to 15 APEC members; China, Chinese Taipei and Papua New Guinea were
not members of the GATT and thus not founding members of the WTO.
76 Singapore vigorously campaigned to host the first post-Uruguay Round meeting of trade
ministers, which was held in December 1996. In addition, the Asian members of APEC endorsed the Korean candidate, Dr. Kim Chulsu, who was also a proposed candidate for the head
of the newly formed World Trade Organization. Dr. Chulsu later became one of the WTO's
Deputy Director Generals.
77 Although a number of countries included proposals to accelerate their Uruguay Round
undertakings in a number of areas, the patchwork of undertakings comprising the initial IAP's
are difficult to evaluate. There is little uniformity in areas covered and no benchmark against
which to evaluate country offers. This makes comparisons of proposals across countries difficult.
A few examples are illustrative. Australia committed to acclerate by one year its tariff bindings
on some 2800 tariff lines. It also agreed to add certain services to GATS coverage. Canada
stated its intention to extend and expand on its duty free tariffs for LDCs. Chile indicated its
intention to accelerate implementation of tariff commitments across the board. Japan listed a
number of tariff areas where it intended to accelerate its UR implementation, but most of these
were areas where it was already applying lower rates that had yet to be bound in the WTO.
Japan also identified a number of deregulation measures designed to improve business access,
the latter of which were expected announcements in line with Japan's schedule of domestic deregulation. Beijing's package has been characterized by some analysts as more substantial, including 30% tariff reductions on more than 4,000 items. China also committed to eliminate the
quota, licensing, and other import control measures on about 170 tariff lines, accounting for over
30% of the commodities now subject to import quota and licensing requirement. But in China's
case, it is important to keep in mind that its package was offered with an eye toward the WTO
accession process underway in Geneva. Indonesia committed to reduce a number of its tariff
items. The U.S. offer referenced a number of regulatory changes already underway. For example, it cited its customs modernization efforts and efforts to streamline federal procurement prac-
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APEC can make itself a vehicle for accelerating Uruguay Round commitments, but the issue remains alive.
Turning to tariffs, every round of multilateral trade negotiations
in the postwar period has included negotiated tariff reductions. The
Uruguay Round achieved significant increases in the percentage of
tariffs subject to bindings, and substantial reductions in tariffs on industrial and agricultural products by APEC and non-APEC
countries. 78

Tariff reductions alone, however, do not tell the whole story.
Many of the developing economies of APEC have bound their tariffs
at rates higher than those currently applied. 79 Thus although technically this represents tariff reductions, it suggests that the actual resulting reductions may do little to improve market access. 80 Although the
developing countries of East Asia are credited with having the lowest
applied rates of tariffs among the developing regions of the world, the
gap between bound rates and applied rates continues.
In the industrial goods area, for example, the average bound rates
range from less than 10% for Korea and Malaysia to nearly 40% for
tices. It also mentioned efforts underway to streamline its regulations on export controls, certain
improvements in FDA procedures governing medical devices, and the paperwork reduction act.
See Action Agenda, supra note 66. One senior Japanese economist, Ippei Yamazawa, who
served as a member of the EPG, claimed that the U.S. offer was "very weak indeed." He ranked
the South Korean and Thai packages as poor and the Philippine package as "not very impressive." See David Hulme, Asia Takes Charge of APEC Train, 32 AsIA Bus. 32, 32-35 (1996); see
also Yang Razali Kassim, FormerMilitary Man Takes Chargeof APEC,Bus. TIMEs, Feb. 6,1996,
at 12, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library,, CURNWS File.
78 For example, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United States, Chile, Mexico, and Indonesia have nearly comprehensive tariff bindings. Many of the developing countries of Asia bound
a significant proportion of their tariff lines. For example, Indonesia bound 95% of its tariff lines
and other countries such as Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand have all
bound between 60-89% of their total tariff lines. See PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION COUNCIL, MILESTONES IN APEC LIBRERALIZATION 43 (1995).

79 In terms of overall trends, for developed economies, some 18% of bound imports enter
duty free. Of the remaining imports, two-thirds of tariff lines were reduced as a result of the
Uruguay Round while 9% of tariff lines were bound at higher than the applied rates. Some 7%
of tariff lines experienced no offers, these were primarily in the areas of transport equipment,
leather, rubber, footwear, and travel goods. In terms of share of imports, for developed economies, 19% of imports were'either bound at higher than applied rates or not covered by tariff
bindings. In the case of developing economies, almost no countries have duty free imports.
Forty-six percent of their tariff lines were bound at reduced levels, and 24% were bound at
higher rates than applied rates. Nearly one-third of tariff lines were subject to no offers at all.
Among developing economies as a group, 68% of imports saw now reduction in applied rates or
were not subject to tariff offers. Comparisons across regions are more illuminating. In Asia, 51%
of all imports have seen either no reduction in applied rates or are not subject to tariff offers.
This compares only slightly favorable to Africa, where the comparable statistic is 53%. Id. at 4550.
80 Id.
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Indonesia and over 30% for Mexico. The 1995 applied rates for industrial goods for Korea, Indonesia, and Mexico were 6.5%; 11.3%,
and 13.5%, respectively. 1
In terms of agricultural products, all but two of the APEC countries import a quarter or more of their agricultural products at applied
rates below their bound rates.82
One relatively costless step for APEC members to take to accelerate the Uruguay Round commitments would be to lower their tariff
bindings to their applied rates. While such a step would not necessarily increase access to their markets, it would serve as an important
symbol of their commitment to trade liberalization. Economically,
lowering tariff bindings to applied rates is relatively costless because it
simply brings de jure rates into line with de facto tariff rates.
Bringing tariff bindings down to applied rates would, however,
require APEC members to forego the possibility of raising their tariffs
if domestic circumstances were seen as warranting such increases.
Although this provides one with an admittedly narrow perspective
from which to view APEC's efforts to support multilateral trade liberalization, early indications suggest that further tariff reductions, even
down to applied levels, are likely to prove difficult for a number of
APEC countries.8 3 And even if countries dropped their applied tariff
rates, this step offers little assurance that rates will remain at lower
levels unless countries then took the next step of binding those lower
rates in the WTO.
2.

The Position of APEC and its Members on Basic
Telecommunications Services Negotiations

Another way of viewing the likely contribution of APEC to the
enhancement of multilateral trade disciplines is to examine the posi81 Of the five developed APEC economies, overall tariff reductions were well above the 36%
requirement of the Uruguay Round, with the highest reductions offered by Japan and New Zealand and the lowest reductions by the United States because its tariffs were lower to start with.
After implementation, Japan will have the lowest average tariff rate of 1.7%, followed by the

United States at 3.5%. Post implementation, Australia and New Zealand's average bound tariffs
will be close to three times the average for all developed economies. See COMMIrrEE ON TRADE
AND INVESTMENT, SURVEY OF IMPED MENTS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE APEC RE-

GION 264 (1995).

82 See PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION COUNCIL, supra note 78, at 50.

83 In China's case, for example, Chinese officials have argued that in some instances it is not
politically possible to bring their bound rates down to their applied rates because China's import
regime remains extremely porous and subject to extensive smuggling of imported items. In this
sense, imports enter China far in excess of even applied rates. Interview with a PRC official
(June 20, 1996).
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tions taken by APEC members in the context of the
Uruguay Round
84
services.
telecommunications
basic
negotiations on
A few contextual points may be useful to offer perspective. For
most of the postwar period, services have been among the most highly
regulated sectors of economic activity worldwide. During the 1970's
and 1980's, regulatory reform efforts in many countries, especially in
the developed economies, resulted in the removal or liberalization of
prior limits on competition in a number of industries. Beginning in
the 1980's, services became part of the international trade policy
agenda, largely as a result of the efforts of the U.S. government to
pursue multilateral rules to govern policies affecting trade in services.
But, as others have noted, the decision to negotiate on telecommunications established a negotiating process on matters which, from
the outset, there was "far from a consensus as to the appropriateness
of trade strictures" and considerable divergence of opinion as to the
domestic effects of deregulation and liberalization. 85 Thus, the serv-

ices negotiations in general have been one of the most difficult areas
and certainly among the newest areas of multilateral trade
negotiations.
Advocates of liberalization of trade in services have tended to
argue that more liberal international trade will produce domestic
gains.86 But international differences on this point have varied
greatly, especially between some developed and developing economies. 87 And indeed the negotiation of access to services markets, as
distinct from negotiations over barriers to goods, implicates fundamental issues of regulatory design.
84 This article focuses on basic telecommunications as distinct from other areas of services
trade because basic telecoms remains under negotiation in the WTO.
85 See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE (1995).

86 The United States has not been alone in advocating multilateral disciplines for basic telecommunication services. During the Uruguay Round, a group of countries including the United
States, Sweden, Australia and New Zealand, among others pressed for an agreement on the
liberalization of basic telecommunications to be included as part of the GATS. See, e.g., GA7T
LiberalisersDiscuss Basic Service Competition, Fin. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
87 See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 85, at 225. The authors note that during the Uruguay Round negotiations, for example, a number of developing countries argued that developed
countries had a comparative advantage in services by virtue of their overall level of economic
and technological development, and if liberalization occurred under these circumstances, developing country providers would lose out. Id. This proposition has been challenged most forcefully by the economist Jagdish Bhagwati. See Jagdish Bhagwati, InternationalTrade in Services
and its Relevance for Economic Development, in POLrICAL ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIcs (1991).
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Within the context of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which is itself largely a framework agreement, the parties to the negotiations were able to agree on general principles
covering trade in services. With respect to telecommunications more
specifically, the parties agreed on an annex on telecommunications.88
However, the concerns of U.S. services industries regarding the
application of unconditional MFN led to the inclusion of an annex to
the GATS under which countries could exempt, at the time of joining
the GATS, certain sectors from the MFN obligation contained in the
GATS. In the final days of the Uruguay Round, it became apparent
that a number of countries were prepared to invoke the MFN exceptions (i.e., for financial services, telecommunications, maritime and
audio-visual), and a compromise solution was ultimately reached
whereby negotiations would continue on a number of these sectors.
The deadline for negotiations on basic telecommunications services
was initially set for April of 1996.19
Some 53 countries participated in the ensuing basic telecom negotiations with 24 other countries formally taking observer status. 90 The
negotiations focused on three elements: obtaining commitments from
countries to liberalize market access and national treatment restrictions and efforts to reach agreement on a set of regulatory principles
that are to guide domestic regulatory practices. The regulatory principles were intended to complement the market access and national
treatment commitments. The principles reflect a recognition that tele88 The Annex on telecommunications provides for transparent, reasonable and non-discriminatory access to, and use of, public telecommunications transport networks and services. "It
proscribes the imposition conditions on access and use other than those necessary to ensure the
availability of services to the general public or to protect the technical integrity of the network. It
requires that Members undertake to price public telecom services on a cost-oriented basis and
allow interconnection and cross-border movement of information." See Bernard Hoeckman &
Pierre Sauve, Liberalizing Trade in Services, in WoRLD BANK DIScuSSION PAPERS 38 (1995). It
does not, however, cover measures applying to the provision of public telecommunications networks and services.
89 The Final Act of the Uruguay Round contained a Decision on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1138 [hereinafter the Telecommunication Decision]
(provided for an extension of those negotiations under the direction of the Negotiating Group
on Basic Telecommunications (NGBT) until April of 1996). In addition, the Telecommunication
Decision further provided that negotiations should be entered into "on a voluntary basis with a
view to the progressive liberalization of trade in telecommunications transport networks and
services.. .within the framework of the GATS." See Telecommunication Decision, art. 1. These
negotiations were to be "comprehensive in scope with no basic telecommunications excluded a
priori." See Telecommunications Decision, art. 2.
90 Basic telecom services have been defined as "local and long-distance voice and data transmission services." See Final Draft of WTO Telecom Regulatory Principles, April 30, 1996, at 1
[hereinafter Telcom Regulatory Principles].
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communications remains a heavily regulated sector and in many jurisdictions regulatory authorities are not independent of telecom
providers. And, since domestic suppliers are usually dominant suppliers, whether private or public entities, if they are left free to make
decisions about how to treat other suppliers, such entities would be
capable of thwarting the market access and national treatment commitments made by governments. 91
Thus, the regulatory principles were designed to support competition in the telecommunications sector through competitive safeguards
that would prevent major suppliers from engaging in anticompetitive
practices:92 through undertakings to provide transparent and nondiscriminatory interconnections with essential telecommunications facilities; through transparent and publicly available licensing criteria; and
by requiring that domestic regulatory authorities are independent
from and not accountable to any supplier of basic telecommunications
services, among other features.93
The U.S. government argued that the critical elements for an
agreement were mutual, unrestricted access to basic telecommunications markets and open investment among a "critical mass" of countries. At the end of April 1996, the U.S. government found that only
10 of the 53 offers acceptable, 94 and that there was insufficient progress, especially among the advanced nations but also within the important Asian markets, to warrant the United States entering into an
agreement that would have obliged it to keep its telecommunications
market open.
In an effort not to lose the momentum that had been developed,
the Director General of the WTO then called for an extension of the
talks until February 17, 1997. The United States, for its part, reserved
its right to modify or withdraw its offer, should the talks fail achieve
91 See Bernard M. Hoeckman et al., Antitrust Disciplines and Market Access Negotiations:
Lessons from the Telecommunications Sector, Paper presented at the Oslo Competition Conference: Competition Policies For An Integrated World Economy, Oslo (June 13-14, 1996) (avail-

able on file with M.E. Janow).

92 Identified anticompetitive practices included cross subsidization, using information obtained from competitive with anticompetitive results and "not making available to other suppliers on a timely basis technical information about essential facilities and commercially relevant
information which are necessary for them to provide services." See Telcom Regulatory Principles, supra note 90.
93 Id.

94 U.S. trade officials argued that while the U.S. had made "the most comprehensive market
opening offer of any nation," over "40 percent of world telecom revenues and over 34 percent of
global international traffic are not covered by acceptable offers." See Statement of Ambassador
Charlene Barshefsky, Basic Telecom Negotiations, Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (Apr. 30, 1996).
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sufficient liberalization packages by the new deadline. What was the
position taken by APEC countries in these negotiations? As noted,
the United States identified ten countries that provided open market
access offers equivalent to the U.S. offer; among the APEC members,
only New Zealand was identified as one of the ten.95 The offers of
every other APEC member were seen, at least by the United States,
as deficient in one way or another. Both Indonesia and Malaysia
failed to make any offers within the context of the basic telecom negotiations.96 Six of the APEC members adopted the regulatory principles,97 but each of their offers contained some limitations in terms of
market access or investment restrictions. 98 And, three of the APEC
countries, Thailand, Philippines, and Chile, either refused to adopt the
regulatory principles or made a less than full commitment to the
principles. 99
Although this discussion has not identified in detail the specific
negotiating position of individual APEC members, as a general proposition, we may reasonably infer that APEC-based initiatives added
very little discernible momentum to the WTO negotiations. This is
not altogether surprising, especially given the only recent (and still
incomplete) record of domestic telecommunication liberalization in
much of the Asia-Pacific region. Many developing countries have
been fearful that liberalization of telecommunications might threaten
domestic telecom providers, result in job losses, or thwart local efforts
to expand service. 100
95 The other countries included Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the U.K. See Id.

96 Other countries that failed to make any offers included Columbia and South Africa. See
id.
97 These included: Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong. See id.
98 For example, Hong Kong hinted local wire-line and wireless network services were limited
to the current four providers and no commitments were made to keep its market open for local
or international public wire/wireless services and facilities even after the expiration of Hong
Kong Telecom's exclusive rights in 2006. Singapore's offer committed to open facilities and services by 2002 with the exception of international simple resale. It chose, however, to retain a 40%
ceiling on foreign investment. Among the developed members of APEC, Canada maintained an
investment limit of 46.7% in general with additional limits on foreign investment in mobile satellite systems. Australia's offer contained certain investment limits on specific companies. Japan's
offer permits both market access and investment with certain investment restrictions for major
domestic and international carriers. See id.
99 The Chairman of the FCC has identified Singapore and Hong Kong as delaying "too long
in the complete opening of their markets given their sophisticated national economies." See
Reed Hundt, Speech to the Institute for International Economics (Oct. 23, 1996) <http://
www.fcc.gov/speeches/hundt>.
100 See id.
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Despite these concerns, all February 15, 1997, negotiators in Geneva announced the conclusion of what appears to be a historic and
comprehensive agreement on basic telecommunications, inclusive of
major undertakings in each of three areas mentioned above: market
access, investment, and regulatory principles. 0 1
3. An Information Technology Agreement
In the run up to the Manila meetings, the U.S. government
pushed hard to obtain an APEC endorsement of the so-called Information Technology Agreement (ITA), within the WTO. APEC's support of an ITA was seen as offering some potential for spurring the
WTO members to eliminate tariffs in this vast sector of economic activity."02 To this end, the Leader's Declaration contained a reference
to the conclusion of an "information technology agreement by the
WTO Ministerial Conference that would substantially eliminate tariffs
by the year 2000, recognizing
the need for flexibility as negotiation in
0 3
Geneva proceed."

President Clinton characterized this ITA reference as a "big deal"
and stated that he was "especially pleased that today the APEC lead101 This recent negotiating record raises an important question that pertains not only to telecommunications but to difficult sectoral issues more generally. The logic of the so-called "single
package" approach of the Uruguay Round (UR) was premised on the notion that negotiators
would be able to achieve more by way of concrete commitments if all of the negotiated areas
were under a single undertaking. In other words, countries would be able to make concessions
across sectors that would result in a better package of concessions overall than if negotiations
were seperated into specific areas and the concessions were only available on a conditional MFN
basis to those countries that made comparable offers. As it turned out, that logic did not provide
enough of an incentive for countries to make sufficiently ambitious market access offers to induce the United States to bind its offer on an unconditional MFN basis in the telecom or financial services sectors during the UR. The subsequent negotiations on a sectoral basis have only
recently in telecommunications reached a satisfactory conclusion. This record raises the broader
question whether all sectors are not ripe for multilateral negotiations.
102 The U.S. government has defined information technolgy to include products inclusive of
semiconductors, software, fax machines, modems, computers, telecommunications equipment
and others. U.S. government sources argue that ITA products are worth $1 trillion annually and
that an agreement to eliminate tariffs in these sectors will accelerate global trade and save the
U.S. industry over $1 billion each year. Global trade in information technology amounted to
$500 million in 1995, 80% of that was among APEC countries but tariffs remain high in many
jurisdictions. For example, tariffs on computers in Korea, Thailand and the Philippines are as
high as six times the levels in the United States, while EU tariffs on local area network equipment are twice as-high as in the United States. Similarly, "semiconductor tariffs in the EU can be
as high as 14%, 10% in the Philippines and 10% in Thailand, as compared with zero in the
United States. And tariffs in telecommunications equipment are as high as 15% in Indonesia,
20% in Korea, and 14% in the EU, much higher than in the United States." See USTR Press
Release, APEC Leaders Back Agreement to Eliminate Technology Tariffs by Year 2000 (Nov.
25, 1996) available through USTR online facsimile retrieval as document number 40240.
103 See Leaders' Declaration, supra note 73, 13.
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ers endorsed the early completion of an information technology
agreement which would cut to zero tariffs a vast array of computers,
semiconductors and telecommunications by the year 2000." 1°4 But almost immediately, there was open disagreement among APEC officials as to the meaning of the ITA undertaking.
The language in the Declaration does not specifically state that
tariffs will be reduced to zero but rather indicates that tariffs will be
"substantially eliminated." United States officials commented that
this terminology was in fact "tradespeak for zero," but there appears
to be considerable ambiguity on this point. 0 5 For example, when
asked if Malaysia had commited itself to eliminating tariffs on information technology products by 2000, Prime Minister Mahathir indicated that this was actually a non-binding undertaking, and one that

"if we are ready, we will do it. If not, we will not."'10 6 Reservations
about the year 2000 were also expressed by senior officials from Thailand and Singapore.' 7
Thus, at the end of the Manila meetings, it was far from clear

whether or not the APEC undertaking on ITA represented a hearty
endorsement of liberalization of tariffs in information technologies.
Nor was it clear whether the APEC language on an ITA was likely to
contribute much momentum to the deliberations at the WTO ministerial. As it turned out, at the December WTO meetings some 28 countries agreed to eliminate duties for certain specified information
technologies beginning in 1997 and concluding in 2000. This represented well over 80 percent of trade in these products. 8 Thus, with
the benefit of hindsight, it appears that the early endorsement, even
tentative, by some APEC countries for the ITA was a useful founda104 William J. Clinton, Remarks by the Presidentto the Embassy Community (Nov. 25, 1996)
<http'J/www.whitehouse.gov/WHlhtmlfbriefroom.html>.
105 See Ambassador John Wolf, Assistant USTR Bob Cassidy and Ambassador Winston
Lord, Press Briefing (Nov. 25, 1996) <http'//www.whitehouse.gov/WH/htmlfbriefroom.html>.
106 See Tim STAR (Nov. 26, 1996) <http'//www.apecgspa.washington.edu/apecmedial
mediahtml>.
107 See Anuraj Manibhandu, BANrKOK PosT (Nov. 20, 1996) <http://www.apec.org/
newmedia>. Singapore's Prime Minister Go Chok Tong was quoted as saying that while the
agreement was helpful, "it Vill not lead to a firm conclusion that we are going to free up the
information technology sector by the year 2000. It could be treated by members any way they
want to." See Bill Tarrant, APEC Fudge Gives Good Nudge to WTO, REurERs, Nov. 26, 1996,
availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
108 WoRLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, MINISThRIAL DECLARATION ON TRADE IN INFORMA-

TECHNOLOGY PRODUCrS (Dec. 13, 1996). The 28 countries included Australia, Canada,
Taiwan, European Union (15 members), Hong Kong, Iceland, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Norway,
Singapore, Switzerland, brkey, and the United States.
TION
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tion for generating additional momentum for liberalization of tariffs
on certain information technologies at the WTO.
B. Regional Trade Liberalization through APEC
The inclusion of trade liberalization as a central component of the
APEC process has been controversial but is now firmly rooted as one
of the three pillars of the APEC agenda. The Bogor Declaration established APEC's long-term goal of free trade in the region, and the
Osaka Action Agenda advanced an approach for achieving those
goals and offered a few initial proposals.
Some concrete offers in the form of individual action plans were
presented at the Manila APEC meetings. Since trade and investment
liberalization through the APEC process is still at an early stage, it is
too soon to draw any hard and fast conclusions. The early evidence
suggests a mixed picture.
As to approach, there has still been no resolution of the issue of
whether to apply the liberalization achieved within APEC to nonmembers on an unconditional, most-favored nation basis or on a reciprocal basis. The U.S. government has resisted accepting the notion
that liberalization must rest solely on unconditional extension of the
benefits on a MFN basis. Its reasoning stems from a concern that unconditional extension would amount to giving other countries, notably
Europe, a free ride on American concessions. This reflects the judgment that unconditional MFN provides insufficient incentives for nonmembers to undertake comparable liberalization measures.
Advocates of this perspective tend to argue that unconditional
MFN liberalization by an economy as large as that of the United
States constitutes a disincentive for other countries to support another
round of multilateral trade negotiations. For this reason, the argument goes, APEC members must be free to refuse to extend APEC
trade liberalization to nonmembers. As a negotiating tactic, this
would induce non-members to offer comparable concessions. 10 9
Given the size of the U.S. market relative to that of the small and
medium size economies of APEC, this stance by the United States is
not surprising. It is consistent with the position taken by the United
States in the Uruguay Round (including in telecom services), and it
does not necessarily imply an unwillingness to further open the U.S.
market to imports of goods and services. U.S. trade policy makers
109 See Linnan, supra note 4, at 829-31.
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now perennially stress the importance of reciprocal trade
concessions. 110
A closely related issue dividing APEC's members is the APEC
modality for liberalizing trade and investment, embodied in the Action Agenda's proposed approach of taking both collective and unilateral actions. The tension on this point also stems in part from
differing perspectives as to whether unilateral measures will provide
the necessary incentives for countries to undertake meaningful and
politically difficult reforms. For this reason, the United States pressed
for the inclusion of collective measures as part of the Osaka Agenda,
believing that this would help to encourage the drawing up of meaningful liberalization proposals and to inspire APEC members to take
comparable steps. More generally, the United States, Canada, Singapore, Hong Kong, and some others are associated with the position
that APEC undertakings should strive to be rule-based and
formalized.
Some countries, such as China, Thailand, and Malaysia, are seen
to favor an approach to trade and investment liberalization that relies
primarily on unilateral measures. This stems at least in part from a
desire to preserve policy flexibility, including the ability of those countries to protect their domestic industries until they have become internationally competitive."' An additional motivation may stem from
the recognition that external pressure to liberalize coming from the
United States or other countries has the potential to derail existing
liberalization in developing countries and to generate political
112
backlash.
Those academics and government officials who argue that MFN
liberalization within APEC is possible and desirable, and that unilateral liberalization will prove and already has proven meaningful, tend
to focus on underlying economic factors. Notably, the evidence that
many countries in the Asia-Pacific region are choosing to further open
their markets for their own economic reasons, not because they are
obliged to do so through trade negotiations." 3
110 Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky put it this way: "Building and maintaining an American
constituency for an internationalist trade policy depends in no small part on establishing greater
reciprocity in trade - where we share both benefits and the obligations .... Unfortunately, while
Asia is a region of enormous potential, it is also the region where Americans face the greatest
obstacles in trade." See Barshefsky, supra note 7.
111 See Hugh T. Patrick, Part I: Some Thoughts on the Future of APEC (May 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with M.E. Janow).
112 See FuNA.Ass,
supra note 15, at 121.

113 See Peter Drysdale & Ross Garnaut, Principles of Pacific Economic Integration,in AsIA
PACIFIC REGIONAUSM, supra note 7, at 48-61.
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Proponents of this point of view further argue that the "trade ex-

pansion game" that has emerged in the Pacific can be characterized as
"prisoner's delight" rather than a prisoner's dilemma. In the latter
scenario, liberalization is viewed as a concession in order to overcome
the possibility of unfavorable outcomes. In the Pacific, it is argued,
the dynamic is quite different. Because liberalization enhances economic performance, this has "changed the political perceptions of the
'
payoff matrix."114
In this regard, it is argued that the Asia Pacific region is already experiencing "competitive liberalization.""' 5 The
APEC methodology of open regionalism, operationalized through
collective actions and concerted unilateral offers, is seen as being
likely to "ratchet up" trade and investment liberalization even without
negotiated agreements. 16
Since the 1980's, there has been significant liberalization in all the
APEC economies, especially in terms of reductions in the level of official border restrictions." 7 And certainly APEC's Asian members
have consistently eschewed the protectionism of others. There also is
little if any evidence that through APEC-sponsored initiatives its
members have undertaken liberalization measures that discriminate
against non-members. In these respects, the positive-sum dynamic implied above may accurately characterize what is driving the trade and
investment liberalization that is occurring in the Asia-Pacific region.

114 The authors go so far as to argue that "any perceived disadvantages in chances in income
distribution associated with trade liberalization are judged by the political process to be less
important than the gains for the nation as a whole." Id. at 51.
115 See Bergsten, supra note 6, at 23.
116 A number of U.S. and Asia-based economists hold this view of Asian liberalization and
the APEC process. Notable among them are C. Fred Bergsten of the Institute for International
Economics in Washington D.C. and Peter Drysdale of Australia National University. Some of
Dr. Bergsten's writings have argued that the formation of the European Economic Community
spurred the U.S. to launch the Dillon and Kennedy Rounds of GATT negotiations. Similarly, the
engagement of the EEC propelled the U.S. to push for the Tokyo Round. And, the U.S. pursuit
of regional agreements with Israel and Canada in the 1980's, Bergsten has argued, convinced the
EC to drop its earlier resistant against a new multilateral round of trade talks, which helped to
launch the Uruguay Round. See Jeffrey A. Frankel, Does Regionalism Undermine Multilateral
Trade Liberalizationor Support it? A PoliticalEconomy Survey, Regional Trading Blocs (1996).
More recently, as noted above, the APEC Seattle Leader's Meeting in the context of APEC
served to jolt the Europeans into making more progress in the Uruguay Round. Although these
examples are often cited as evidence for the proposition that regional arrangement can serve as a
catalyst for multilateral trade liberalization, they may also be viewed as reactions against what
some countries have perceived as potentially discriminatory arrangements rather than affirmations of a shared confidence in the open and non-discriminatory approach embodied in the current APEC approach to trade liberalization.
117 See Drysdale & Garnaut, supra note 7, at 48
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But those dimensions only provide a partial picture of trade liberalization in the Asia-Pacific region.
For the time being, numerous impediments to trade and investment remain in the Asia Pacific region. 11 8 Some countries continue
to pursue policies that reflect discriminatory impulses, despite the
weak standstill commitment contained in the Action Agenda. 119 If
trade and investment liberalization in the APEC context is limited
only to those steps that countries have on their own initiative decided
118 It is clearly beyond the scope of this article to detail the full range of impediments to trade
and investment that remain in the Asia Pacific region. However, for illustrative purposes, it is
useful to identify several studies that give different dimensions of remaining trade and investment restraints. Arvind Panagariya argues that there is substantial variation in the level of protection across APEC countries. For example, Hong Kong and Singapore are free trading
economies. Quantitative restrictions have virtually disappeared in Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, but tariff rates remain high in a number of APEC countries, especially in
Thailand. See Arvind Panagariya, East Asia and the New Regionalism in World Trade, 17 WORLD
ECONOMY 817, 821 (1994). According to World Bank estimates, effective rates of protection for
manufacturing in Indonesia, Thailand, Korea, the Philippians, and Malaysia are estimated at
52%, 51%, 28%, 32%, and 23% respectively. See Building on the Uruguay Round, East Asian
Leadership In Liberalization, A World Bank Discussion Paper (April 1994). Gary Hufbauer, a
Senior Fellow at the Institute for International Economics in Washington D.C., has recently
launched a major comparative study that examines the cost of protection in a number of countries including the United States, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, China, the E.U., Australia, and Canada. Early conclusions of this study argue that "old fashioned trade barriers still impose major
costs, both in developed and developing countries." See Gary Hufbauer, Surveying the Costs of
Protection: A Partial Equilibrium Approach, Paper prepared for a Conference sponsored by the
Institute for International Economics (June 1996). Two studies undertaken under the auspices
of the PECC and mentioned elsewhere above have identified in quantitative and qualitative
terms the range of measures taken by APEC economies to liberalize their economies as well as
remaining restraints. See PECC, supra note 78; PECC, supranote 81. See also Merit E. Janow,
Japan's Uncertain Politics, Testimony Before the House Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs and the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Committee on International Relations, Oct. 30, 1995. This testimony identifies a number of sources of resistance to
economic deregulation in Japan even in the face of considerable domestic support for the domestic gains that deregulation might augur for the Japanese economy. For perspectives on deregulation in South Korea. See Kim Do Hoon, Korea's Experience in Regulatory Reform, Korean
Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade, July 9-10, 1996 (mimeo on file with M.E. Janow).
Here it is noted that in South Korea, President Kim Young Sam outlined an ambitious deregulation program including plans to deregulate state monopolies in the steel, power generation and
telecoms sector, but these efforts appear to have met with substantial opposition from domestic
interests including existing monopolists and government ministries. Dr. Kim notes that while the
Korean government has deregulated a number of economic regulations, government efforts have
been largely focused on easing the procedural regulations and the most serious regulations that
restrict access to the Korean market have been "put aside, left untouched." Id.
119 A notable example in this regard was President Suharto's decree in June 1996 to let the
Indonesian "national car" be initially produced in South Korea and imported duty-free, while
keeping in place a tariff level of some 125% to apply to imported cars from other countries.
Japan, the United States, and the E.U. have challenged Indonesia's automotive practices at the
WTO as violating GATr Articles I and III as well as TRIMs. See <http://www.wto.orglwtol
dispute/bulletin>.
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to take irrespective of the actions of others, then the issue of MFN
treatment is less likely to be a major obstacle to trade liberalization.
But MFN is not meaningful in and of itself without market access. To
put it another way, if a country provides MFN treatment to its trading
partners but denies all of them effective access to its domestic markets, then MFN has very little meaning.
Are the gains from liberalization so overwhelmingly clear to
APEC members that leaders (and legislatures) in the Asia-pacific region are prepared to unilaterally liberalize on an MFN basis, without
obtaining major concessions from other countries and in the face of
strong domestic pressure groups that see such liberalization as antithetical to their commercial interests? The record of multilateral
trade negotiations (alluded to briefly above), not to mention the history of regional arrangements elsewhere in Asia, suggests that domestic lobbies often are able to persuade policy makers to leave sensitive
20
sectors untouched or subject to only limited reforms.1
Although officials from many of the Asian members of APEC
would find this assertion objectionable, there is little evidence to suggest that the APEC methodology has eliminated the need for negotiations in the classic GATT sense, even within the APEC context. Let
us look again at the dynamics that emerged in arriving at the nonbinding investment principles as well as the Action Agenda. These
two items of recent record suggest that the incipient negotiating style
developing within APEC has not found a way to surmount traditional
obstacles. Instead, special-interest concerns have surfaced in predict21
able ways, and discussions have stumbled at predictable points.'

120 So far, for example, trade preferences within ASEAN or the ASEAN Free Trade Area
(AFTA) have so far had only limited effects, largely because of the limited nature of concessions
offered by AFTA members. See Drysdale & Garnaut, supra note 7, at 48. In a review of
ASEAN's efforts in the 1960's to implement a Preferential Trading Arrangements, Dr. Ippei
Yamazawa of Hitotsubashi University concludes that "none of these have been very successful
because of limited concessions by member countries. Instead, the six countries succeeded in
strengthening their bargaining position against outside developed trading partners." See Ippei
Yamazawa, On Pacific Economic Integration, supra note 7, at 206.
121 Trade economists have for some years studied the manipulation of trading arrangements
by special interests. Jeffrey Frankel has produced a comprehensive summary of this literature.
See Frankel, supra note 116. Dr. Frankel also points out that ASEAN members have until now
exempted almost all of the important sectors from the system of preferences that they have
decided to grant to each other. See id. at 9. Instead, they have tended to liberalize those sectors
that are less likely to be threatened by import competition. A famous example in this respect
was Indonesia's offer to liberalize imports of snow plows, even as it excluded numerous other

major sectors of its economy. Id.
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1. A Look at APEC's Non-Binding Investment Principles
The APEC non-binding investment principles are not only weak
but are weaker in some respects than the investment commitments
already agreed to in the context of the Uruguay Round Trade Related
Investment Measures (TRIMs) - which is itself quite limited in scope.
The TRIMs accord identified an illustrative list of measures
deemed inconsistent with GATT obligations on national treatment

and elimination of quantitative restrictions. The identified measures
included local content requirements, trade-balancing requirements,
foreign-exchange balancing requirements and domestic sales requirements.'22 Yet even these areas are not fully delineated in APEC's
non-binding investment principles. This is curious given the fact that
all of the APEC member economies, with the exception of China and

Taiwan are subject to WTO disciplines.
The preamble to the non-binding APEC principles states that

these are principles to which "APEC Members aspire."'1 3 They contain some 12 provisions covering: transparency; nondiscrimination between source economies; national treatment; investment incentives;
performance requirements; expropriation and compensation, repatriation and convertibility; entry and sojourn of personnel; removal of

barriers to capital exports; avoidance of double taxation; investor behavior; and settlement of disputes.' 4 Some of the principles, notably
the transparency and nondiscrimination provisions, have been drafted
relatively unambiguously.'2 Both of these principles address matters
122 Local content measures and trade balancing requirements were identified in the TRIMs as
being inconsistent with Article III of the GATT on national treatment. Similarly, foreign exchange balancing restrictions and domestic sales requirements were identified as inconsistent
with Article XI or the GATT governing quantitative restrictions. The TRIMs was silent on
export performance requirements. For TRIMs covered by the Uruguay Round, WTO members
were required to notify the WTO of all GATT inconsistent measures within ninety days of entry
into force of the WTO. All such notified TRIMs are then subject to a phasing out process subject
to various timetables depending on whether the notifying country is an industrial, developing or
LDC member. A recent PECC report has shown that as of May 1955, five APEC member
economies had made notifications to the WTO - i.e., Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, and Thailand. See PECC, supra note 81, chptr. 6. The absence of notification by others
presumably indicates their belief that there were no GATT-inconsistent TRIMs in place. This
same PECC report identified the local content requirements, administrative impediments, discriminatory market access or national treatment standards, and operational restrictions imposed
by APEC economies. The list of such measures is lengthy. The PECC Report concluded that all
APEC members continue to restrict inward foreign investment in some way. Id.
123 See Bora & Graham, supra note 61.
124 Id

125 For example, the transparency principle states plainly that "[mi]ember economies will
make alllaws, regulations, administrative guidelines, and policies pertaining to investment in
their economies publicly available in a prompt, transparent and readily accessible manner." See
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of obvious importance to investors, and both are core GATT principles. Other provisions of the non-binding principles, such as the prin-

ciples covering national treatment, performance requirements, and
avoidance of double taxation, enshrine exceptions or contain caveats
126

that could easily nullify the principle to which they are attached.
Furthermore, certain obvious government investment restrictions
that have been applied by most of the developing countries of APEC

and some of the developed countries of APEC find no reference in
the principles at all. For example, the reference to investment incentives is limited to a prohibition against relaxation of health, safety, and
environmental regulations. It ignores a host of commonly applied incentives such as coverage of foreign-exchange risk, export taxes, use
of other incentive schemes, or subsidies more generally. 2 7
Performance requirements, another major impediment to potential investors in a number of APEC countries, also received limited
attention in the non-binding principles. These simply state that member economies will minimize their use, thereby leaving unaddressed
the issue of whether or not APEC countries will continue to include
export minimums, domestic content requirements, limitations on royalties, trade-balancing requirements, land-use restrictions, technology
transfer or licensing requirements, local equity restrictions, and other
such commonly applied restrictions in the more restrictive investment
regimes of APEC members.
Importantly, the principles contain no standstill or rollback provisions, nor do the principles define investment. The principles do include a dispute settlement provision, but this provision seems
id The niondiscrimination between source economies reads: "Member economies will extend to
investors from any economy treatment - in relation to the establishment expansion and operation of their investments - that is no less favorable than that accorded to investors from any
other economy in like situations, without prejudice to relevant international obligations and
principles." See id.
126 For example, the national treatment principle provides that "With exceptions as provided
for in domestic laws, regulations, and policies, member economies will accord to foreign investors - in relation to the establishment, expansion, operating, and protection of their investment treatment no less favorable than that accorded in like situations to domestic investors." See id.
The performance requirement principles states that "member economies will minimize the use
of performance requirements that distort or limit expansion of trade and investment." Id. Similarly, the principles covering removal of barriers to capital exports states that "member economies accept that regulatory and institutional barriers to outlaw of investment will be minimized."
ld. And, the double taxation principles states that "member economies will endeavor to avoid
double taxation related to foreign investment." Id.
127 The provision on investment incentives states that "[mlember economies will not relax
health, safety, and environmental regulations as an incentive to encourage foreign investment."
Id.
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especially artificial given that it would be foolhardy for an investor to
try to seek redress either through arbitration or through litigation for
a violation of the non-binding principles. 2 '
If one takes at face value the proposition that these principles
represent the standards to which APEC economies "aspire," then that
should raise concerns about the prospect of achieving the Bogor goal
of free trade and investment by the target dates of 2020/2010. The
APEC principles as currently drafted afford no degree of meaningful
legal protection to investors from arbitrary and capricious actions of
governments. 129 Doubtless for that very reason, business groups have
argued that APEC should strengthen the existing principles and revised principles should then be rendered legally enforceable through
130
their incorporation into the domestic laws of each APEC member.
More recently, in October 1996, the APEC Business Advisory Council
(ABAC) called for an expansion of the principles.' 3 '
This response from at least some important voices in the international business community was predictable. Indeed, even during the
negotiation of the principles, many Asian nations apparently were
concerned that they soon would be pressured to turn the non-binding
principles into binding ones. This concern seems to have turned into a
desire to keep the principles sufficiently weak so as to foreclose the
possibility that the resulting principles would receive much support
from the international business community.
128 The principles state: "Member economies acecpt that disputes arising in connection with a
foreign investment will be settled promptly through consultations and negotiations between the
parties to the dispute or, failing this, through procedures for arbitration in accordance with members' international commitments or through other arbitration procedures acceptable to both parties." Id.
129 This perspective is shared by a number of experts who have been involved in the APEC
initiative on investment. For example, Mark Borthwick, Executive Director of PECC, stated in
Congressional testimony that "the agreement last year by APEC was arrived in too great haste
and fell short of the expectations of the U.S. government officials who reluctantly and conditionally agreed to it rather than remain isolated on the issue. Some PECC member committees,
particularly the United States, were similarly disappointed. The existing APEC agreement on
investment principles is a clear example of the 'lowest common denominator approach that dilutes the impact and effectiveness of APEC." See Prepared Statement of Mark Borthwick,
Chairman International Coordinating Group, Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC)
Before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
and Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, on Future of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (July 18, 1995), availablein WESTLAW, USTESTIMONY File.
130 See PACIFIC BusnEss FORUM (PBF), OSAKA ACMION PLAN: ROADMAP To REALIZING
THE APEC VISION (1995) <http:\\ www.apecsec.org.publist3.html>.
131 In particular, ABAC suggested that as an interim measure, APEC establish voluntary investment projects under which APEC economies would apply a specific set of improved principles for enhanced investment protection. See APEC BusImSS ADVISORY COUNCIL, APEC
MEANS BUSINESS: REPORT TO THE ECONOMIC LEADERS 1996, at 2 (1996).
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More fundamentally, as one U.S. scholar wisely has noted, since
there was little empirical basis upon which to argue that the absence
of an investment code was impeding the flow of funds into the region,
there also was little incentive for the developing nations of APEC to
raise the principles above the lowest common denominator. 132 All of
this leads one to wonder whether the results were worth the effort.
Granted, a more generous view of the existing non-binding investment principles would see them as reflecting an initial and early
effort to build consensus on a complex and divisive issue. From that
perspective, one could reasonably argue that even these flawed principles have served to inaugurate a process of building consensus within
the region on steps necessary toward even wider investment liberalization.133 Indeed, some experts have argued that the non-binding approach already has proved itself a "valuable experience" for many of
APEC's less developed members, who now have been exposed to alternative views of foreign investment. 134
Certainly the investment principles do not represent the end of a
process of policy dialogue on investment restraints, but rather only a
beginning. Working groups continue to focus on investment rules. At
this juncture it remains unclear whether those efforts ultimately will
take the shape of binding investment principles or less formalized alternatives, such as an improved set of non-binding principles or a regional investment code that countries could enter into on a voluntary
basis. 35
Again, over the long term there are grounds for optimism about
investment liberalization in the Asia-Pacific region. As implied
above, notwithstanding the flaws of the initial non-binding principles
and the current inability of APEC itself to agree on comprehensive

132 See Green, supra note 4, at 734.
133 See Bora & Graham, supra note 61.
134 Id.

135 Several of APEC countries have entered into bilateral investment agreements that contain
undertakings with respect to the right of establishment, the right to transfer funds, and assurances against expropriation. See PECC, PACIFIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1995). An

outside advisory group to the APEC CTI have advanced a number of proposals on how investment liberalization might usefully proceed in the APEC context. One such proposal is that
APEC develop an Asia Pacific investment code that would not seek to impose a uniform investment regime on participating economies but rather would provide a frame of reference or set of
guiding principles that signatories would commit in principle to implement over time. It is argued that this could then serve as the basis for achieving a binding plurilateral instrument. Id. at
122.
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rules, a number of the APEC members are unilaterally liberalizing
their investment regimes.136
The investment principles highlight a paradox that is surfacing in
other areas under review within APEC as well. Countries may already be doing more by way of liberalization, or plan to do more, than
they are prepared to codify or commit to through binding or even
non-binding rule-based instruments. At the same time many impediments to trade and investment remain high in a number of APEC
countries and to that extent, the rhetoric of liberalization has outpaced the reality.
2. Assessing the Action Agenda
Turning to the Osaka Action Agenda, the principles contained
therein are not as limited as the non-binding investment principles,
partly because the former have been designed to guide the overall
process of achieving the Bogor.vision rather than address a specific set
of impediments.
In some respects the Action Agenda resembles the Punta Del
Este Declaration that launched the Uruguay Round. Neither is a leidentified approaches and issues
gally binding document and both
37
1
subject to future liberalization.

136 See PECC, supranote 78, at C13. This report itemizes a number of steps taken in recent
years by APEC countries to liberalize their investment regimes. A few examples are'usefully
referenced here. In China's case, since 1986 it has taken a number of steps to provide greater
market access for foreign investors. In 1986, it permitted 100% foreign capital affiliated enterprises; in 1990, it liberalized its regulations on joint ventures, and in 1991, it liberalized the range
of enterprises eligible for investment. In Indonesia's case, in 1989 it switched from identifying a
positive list of areas where foreign investment was permitted to a negative list - whereby all
investments would be permitted except those explicitly prohibited. Indonesia has made further
modifications in its negative list in 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995. South Korea, for its part, has
undertaken substantial relaxation of certain administrative impediments. For example, it has
reduced the documentation requirements, shortened the processing time for review of investment related documentation and abolished certain review procedures. In Malaysia's case, it has
reduced certain operational restrictions such as the withholding tax on technical fees and royalties, and it now permits exporters to retain a portion of export proceeds in a foreign currency
account in Malaysia. The Philippines for its part in 1991 increased the number of sectors open to
foreign investments, with still additional sectors liberalized in 1994.
137 The Punta Declaration was structured in two parts. Part I, covering negotiation on trade in
goods, included a statement on objectives and eight principles that were to govern the negotiations including: transparency, agreement that the outcome of the negotiations shall be treated as
a single package, an undertaking on balanced concessions, differential and MFN treatment, an
undertaking that developed countries do not expect the developing countries to make contributions inconsistent with their individual development, progressive liberalization on the part of less
developed parties, and special attention to the problems of least developed countries. It also
contained an undertaking on standstill and roll back, identified subjects for negotiation, which
included: tariffs; nontariff measures; tropical products; natural resource based products; textiles
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The "general principles" contained in the Action Agenda are said
to apply to the entire APEC liberalization and facilitation process. 138
Here again, as in the case of the investment principles, some of the
general principles contained in the Osaka Agenda have been drafted
without ambiguity; other principles have been drafted to enshrine
flexibility on the part of individual APEC members to decide how
best to apply the principles in light of their domestic constraints and
priorities. For example, the principles of comprehensiveness, WTO
consistency, and transparency have been drafted in a straightforward
fashion; each states that measures taken 1"will"
be comprehensive,
39
WTO-consistent, and ensure transparency.
In the run up to the meetings, a number of countries, including
Japan, China, Taiwan and Korea were seeking sectoral exclusions for
sensitive sectors. The draft Action Agenda contained an escape
clause that would have permitted countries to avoid making commitments in such difficult areas as agriculture and textiles.140 At the end
of the day, and in no small measure because of the efforts of the
United States and Australia, the principle of comprehensiveness remained in the Osaka Agenda. However, the principles reflect a compromise because they also include a "flexibility" principle designed to
formally acknowledge the different levels of development among the
APEC economies and to provide countries with a basis for contesting
specific trade proposals that might surface in the future.
In addition, the language of the Action Agenda is ambiguous
with respect to the three principles of "comparability," "non-discrimination," "and standstill." In each instance, the principle states that
and clothing; agriculture; GATT Articles; safeguards; MTN Agreements and Arrangements;
subsidies and countervailing measures; dispute settlement; trade related intellectual property
rights and trade related investment measures. See The Punta Del Este Ministerial Declaration,
GATI Focus, Oct. 8, 1989.
138 The 9 principles include: comprehensiveness, WTO consistency, comparability, non-discrimination, transparency, standstill, simultaneous start, continuous process and differentiated
timetables, flexibility, and cooperation. See Action Agenda, supra note 66, Part I, § A.
139 1&

140 See Honorable William Bodde Jr., Senior Advisor, Pacific Basin Economic Council,
United States Member Committee, Statement Before the House Committee on International
Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific and the Subcommittee on Economic Policy and
Trade, Nov. 9, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File. Ambassador Bodde
notes that Japan and China were in favor of sectoral exclusions. In Japan's case, the primary
concern appears to have been agriculture - a sector that had been Japan's major difficulty in the
context of Uruguay Round as well. In China's case, it supported sectoral exclusions because they
wanted to enshrine the principle of exceptions, given that they were not fully sure how their
economy might evolve and they thought that they might want to be able to exclude sectors at
some later date. See also, C. Fred Bergsten, APEC After Osaka: Toward Free Trade by 2010/
2020, Working Paper Series 96-1 (1996).
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the APEC economies "will endeavor" to ensure overall comparability,
will "apply or will endeavor" to apply the principles of non-discrimination and will "endeavor" to "refrain from using measures that
would have the effect of increasing levels of protection." The reasons
for these qualifiers differ in each case. In the case of non-discrimination, it appears that the cautiously worded "will endeavor" was included because the United States was unable to commit to MFN for
China, given the U.S. Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of
1974.141 The comparability point was, in contrast, an undertaking
sought by the United States, because this was seen as a way of applying pressure on APEC members to produce comparably ambitious undertakings. In these ways, the principles reflect compromises
negotiated among the members.
Bearing in mind the debate surrounding the inclusion of a comprehensiveness principle in the Action Agenda, this suggests that the
APEC process has thus far been subject to the same difficulties that
proved so difficult to address in the context of other trade negotiations including the Uruguay Round. Most notable in this regard are
the efforts of some APEC members to exclude from coverage those
sectors (i.e., agriculture) most threatened by a reduction of formal
barriers to trade.
As noted earlier, the inclusion of a comprehensiveness principle
overcame that hurdle in the first instance, but it is not yet clear
whether the compromise reached has removed the tendency for countries to maintain protection for sensitive sectors or simply postponed
the need to address it.
C. APEC's Contribution to Frontier Trade Issues
What role is APEC playing with respect to the "new" issues that
either fall outside of multilateral disciplines or are only partially covered by those disciplines? Early evidence seems to suggest that
APEC initiatives are serving a useful role in deepening understanding
of some issues currently outside of international trade disciplines.
As described in section I above, APEC has developed numerous
working groups that are focusing on a range of issues having direct
bearing on trade and investment and not fully covered by international rules. One notable example in this regard is the facilitation efforts being made in the areas of competition policy, economic
deregulation, and access to services markets broadly. Even the issue
141 See Jackson Vanik Amendment, 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1994).
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of corruption, which only recently has been introduced by the United
States as a potential subject for multilateral negotiations, has been
raised in the APEC forum in the context of improving transparency
and the rules governing government procurement.
In a steady, workaday manner, APEC is providing one of the
very few places where discussions are being held among both developed and developing economies, on a broad range of nontariff issues
that can distort trade and access to markets and with respect to which
there is little consensus, either domestically or internationally.
With the gradual lowering of the more obvious border barriers to
trade and investment, many of the remaining impediments to trade
and investment stem from practices designed primarily to respond to
domestic regulatory concerns. Seen through this lens, APEC's efforts in these new issue areas could be seen as the accretion of information and knowledge about domestic practices with implications for
access to markets and international trade and investment.
Competition policy is a case in point. Increasingly, private business practices have become sources of international trade and commercial friction. And it is increasingly recognized that at least the
market access concerns of trade policy share with competition policy
an interest in enhanced consumer welfare and the fostering of competitive, market oriented environments.14
Although it is widely recognized that private restraints can impede access to markets, there is no comprehensive international
framework of rules or principles covering business practices under
either trade or competition disciplines. Whether anticompetitive and
exclusionary business practices are matters purely for domestic competition authorities or matters properly addressed at an international
level by some mix of trade and competition experts is a topic of ongoing discussion in numerous academic and policy fora.
The degree of experience among the APEC membership with regard to competition policies and norms, ranges from extremely high to
almost nonexistent. By way of examples, the United States, Canada,
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand have each long had established
competition or antitrust regimes in place. Although the approaches
differ, each country has rules that prohibit cartels, rules governing
mergers, and rules governing monopolization. Yet, even with respect
to countries that have established competition laws and policies, many
142 Other "fairness" concerns of trade policy, such as those that underpin anti-dumping rules,

can, in their application, be at greater odds with competition policy approaches.
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respect to the structure and purpose of
important differences -with
43
remain.
those regimes
The range of international experience with regard to cooperation
on antitrust matters is also very wide. Australia and New Zealand
have integrated their trade and competition policy regimes. Recent
years have witnessed expanded cooperation on antitrust matters between the United States and Canada, and the United States and the
E.U., formalized in mutual legal assistance agreements. In Japan's
case, although its formal laws bear resemblance to those of the United
States, the perceived inadequacies of Japan's enforcement of its domestic Anti-monopoly Act has been a source of serious bilateral trade
tension between the United States and Japan. And recent years have
seen numerous bilateral trade cases that have included some element
of competition policy related undertakings so as to address a perceived problem of private restraints. 144
Other APEC members, such as South Korea and Taiwan, have
introduced competition laws and policies only more recently (in 1980
and 1992 respectively) and are still developing competition policy enforcement priorities. Competition authorities in much of Asia are still
in the early days of gaining a measure of independence. Korea's Fair
Trade Commission, for example, was established in 1980 but did not
become an independent agency until 1994. Taiwan's law was introduced only recently, in 1992. Its FTC is an autonomous agency, and
the agency already has reviewed quite a number of cases. China's law
on competition policy was passed in 1993. Its chief aim is to facilitate
the curtailment or elimination of unfair business practices. It does not
establish a specific competition enforcement agency, and it is expected
that only later will laws be introduced to address monopoly concerns.
Indonesia is in the process of developing a domestic competition
law.145 But that law, if introduced at the current time, would operate
in an environment where the government remains actively engaged in
promoting certain industries in the name of national industrial policies
that encourage concentration.
143 Some countries stress consumer welfare and efficiency as the highest of priorities while
others include social goals such as protection of small and medium size industries as among the
central purposes of competition policies. These considerable differences between jurisdictions
have posed substantial hurdles to those contemplating harmonization of competition laws and
policies. See Merit E. Janow, Publicand Private Restraints that Limit Access to Markets, in MAR-

Ki' AccEss AFTER Tim URUGUAY ROUND 101 (1996).

144 Examples include the U.S.-Japan bilateral agreements reached in the glass, semiconductor, automotive, paper, and construction industries as well as the bilateral Structural Impediments Initiative.
145 See Edward Graham (mimeo on file with M.E. Janow).
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Given this diversity of experience with competition laws, institutions, and more fundamentally the very different approaches taken by
APEC members with respect to competition norms, the Action
Agenda undertakings on competition policy appear to be constructive,
of prialbeit early, efforts at deepening understanding on the effect
146
vate restraints on consumer welfare and access to markets.
As noted in the preceding discussion on MRAs, collaboration on
service sector issues has been more advanced than the exploratory discussions in the area of competition policy. As described in Section II
above, in the telecommunications area, for example, the Action
Agenda proposes the development and implementation of a model
Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) on standards by the end of
1997.
Many of these frontier areas are not currently subject to international WTO disciplines; hence, approaches developed within the
APEC context are less constrained than in areas covered by the WTO.
This could provide APEC member countries with some latitude
within which to experiment in any arrangements that they undertake.
Given the economic and political diversity within the Asia-Pacific
region, it does not seem likely, however, that APEC members will
prove better able to develop a common APEC approach to the divisive issues of harmonization of trade and labor rights, trade and the
environment and trade and human rights that are proving contentious
both in APEC and other international fora. 4 7

146 Key elements of the undertakings on competition policy in the Action Agenda include:
review competition policies and laws; develop cooperative arrangements among APEC economies; engage in various information sharing exercises on competition policy; and consider developing non-binding principles on competition policy and laws within APEC. See Action Agenda,
supra note 66.
147 Malaysia has been among the most vocal opponents of the inclusion of these new issues to
the multilateral trade agenda. See Rafida Aziz, Perspectives from the South, Remarks Of Malaysia's Trade Minister Before The Conference On World Trade Organization, July 9-10, 1996. At
this conference, the Minister not only singled out labor standards and corruption, but also took a
broadside attack on what she saw as the interest on the part of developed countries to establish
rules governing competition policy and investment. She stated: "What is even more discomforting is the move by some developed countries to broaden the WrO's work program to include new issues such as multilateral investment rules, labor standards, competition policy, and

corruption/bribery. These are highly contentious issues, and they constitute the single greatest
challenge to the sovereignty and economic prosperity of the developing countries in the future."
Id.
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D.

APEC's Business Facilitation Programs: Reducing Transaction
Costs and Increasing Transparency

APEC also is developing concrete and practical work programs
vis-a-vis technical issues designed to be business-relevant and to reduce the transaction costs for businesses operating in the region. The
Action Plan identifies some 15 areas in which APEC members are
expected to put forward specific liberalization and facilitation proposals at the Manila and subsequent meetings of APEC.
Among the most noteworthy examples of practical programs of
use to business executives are undertakings to simplify and harmonize
customs procedures; achieve mutual recognition arrangements among
APEC economies of standards and conformity assessments in both
regulated and voluntary sectors;148 improve upon the transparency of
government procurement practices; and enhance the mobility of business persons. 4 9 All of these areas reflect areas of regulatory divergence or heterogeneity among APEC members that can impose costs
to potential foreign market entrants. Progress in each of these APEC
agenda items could, therefore, provide concrete gains for businesses
operating in the region.
148 The work of the Committee on Trade and Investment (CrI), which oversees standards
issues, covers some five areas. Some of these areas appear to be making some headway. For
example, there are preliminary discussions of developing APEC-wide mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) on "the acceptance of test data and product certifications in major regulated
sectors." The intent of these efforts is not to try and harmonize safety standards or change national regulations to increase trade. Rather, as experts note, the purpose is to develop methods
of accepting test and certifications for some areas where existing standards of safety are already
in place. In several sectors, APEC members have committed to develop mutual recognition arrangements by specified dates. In the telecommunications sector, the members agreed to develop and begin to implement on an "elective basis a model Mutual Recognition Arrangement
on conformity assessment by the end of 1997." Similarly, in the energy sector, APEC members
agreed to reach agreement by the end of 1999 "on the mutual recognition of testing protocols
and accreditation of laboratories and the acceptance of the tests arising from them." More
broadly, in the standards and conformance section of the Osaka Action Agenda, the APEC
members committed to: ensure transparency of standards and conformity assessments, align
mandatory and voluntary standards with international standards, achieve mutual recognition
among APEC economies, among other measures. The Osaka Action Agenda also identified
guidelines for achieving those broad objectives, including fairly concrete commitments to: place
priority attention to electrical and electronic appliances, food labelling, plastic products and rubber products; develop bilateral, multi-sectoral mutual recognition arrangements that could later
provide the basis for plurilateral arrangements; develop plurilateral mutual recognition arrangements in particular sectors; and consider participation in international treaties on standards. See
Action Agenda, supra note 66, Part 1, Sec. C.
149 In the area of government procurement, the Osaka Action Agenda commits the APEC
members to develop a "common understanding" on government procurement policies and to
"develop by 2000 a set of nonbinding principles on government procurement." Id.
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Let us take mutual recognition arrangements as a case in point.
As scholars have noted, mutual recognition of standards, testing, and
certification arrangements require that jurisdictions accept for domestic purposes certain agreed upon regulatory determinations of other
jurisdictions, even if the underlying criteria on which those determinations are made are not harmonized between the jurisdictions. 5 0
For example, in theory, a mutual recognition arrangement governing telecommunication equipment would provide that if such
equipment had been tested and approved in its home market it would
be permitted to be sold in the importing country. Thus, mutual recognition can permit firms to realize economies of scale across international markets. Mutual recognition agreement (MRAs) also address
transparency concerns since an MRA would forbid domestic regulatory regimes from erecting or applying regulatory barriers to imported
products. 5 '
Although mutual recognition agreements are very complex, they
are proving easier to negotiate than efforts to harmonize regulatory
regimes. This is because the latter, harmonization, requires jurisdictions to make their regulations identical or at least more similar while
the successful negotiation of sectoral or broader MRAs can permit
entry and sale of products or services without requiring fundamental
regulatory convergence.' 52 In part for that reason, MRAs are being
negotiated or considered bilaterally (between the United States and
well as regionally (within APEC, NAFIA) and
Europe), as
53
elsewhere.'
In the APEC context, consultations to develop an MRA in the
telecommunications sector appear to be the most advanced of the
sectoral initiatives. 54 But, at this time, progress in MRAs as well as
150 See David W. Leebron, Lying down with Procrustes: An Analysis of Harmonization
Claims, 41-117 in 1 FAiR TRADE AND HARmONIZATION 41, 91-92 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Rob-

ert E. Hudec eds., 1996).
151 id.
152 See i.

153 In the context of the U.S.-European negotiations, negotiations are underway for the acceptance of testing, product certification and laboratory accreditation in ten industrial sectors.
Some have argued that the fact that the US-EU negotiations have been undertaken as a package
has coptributed to the slow progress in the negotiations. See John 0. Wilson, STANDARDS AND
APEC: AN ACTION AGENDA (1995).

154 As of this writing, the text of draft MRAs has been prepared by several APEC countries.
The draft texts do not require that standards be harmonized. Instead, the drafts presuppose that
signatories would accept test results from testing organizations in the other country. Interview
with U.S. Trade Official (July 1996).
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the other business facilitation
programs identified above are still in
55
the developmental stagey.
Business groups have welcomed APEC's trade facilitation initiatives, but U.S. groups in particular have stressed that these must produce concrete results if APEC is to maintain U.S. business support
and to ensure that APEC does not stagnate. 15 6 More recently,

APEC's Business Advisory Committee has called for concrete measures such as the creation of an APEC Business visa and the establishment of an APEC registry for trademarks and patents, among other
57
measures.

1

155 Given the diversity among the APEC members, there are enormous variations in technical testing capabilities between the nations. One constructive, albeit long-term, idea that has
surfaced within APEC to address concerns about different technical capabilities within the
APEC membership is the idea of developing an APEC Laboratory Recognition Center, which
could be operated by a private institution, and that could certify laboratories in APEC's economies to test and certify exports. This remains in the idea stage. There are other facilitation
efforts that are further along. For example, in an effort to facilitate the flow of goods in the
region, APEC members have apparently already agreed to adopt or abide by the principles of
the Harmonized Tariff classification system starting in 1996. APEC members have also agreed to
adopt or abide by the principles of the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement by the year 2000.
See Trade Opportunities in the Pacific Rim."Hearings Before the House Comm. on Agriculture,
104th Cong. (June 5, 1996) (statement of Jeff Lang, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative). Other,
more mundane but practical achievements include the development of a CD-ROM that contains
current tariff data for every APEC member. Although this CD-ROM was widely publicized by
U.S. officials, it appears that only a fairly limited number of them were produced. Hence, when
this author sought to acquire one for pedagogical purposes, none were available. This is not an
exhaustive list of facilitation efforts underway. Other examples include: preliminary steps to
examine the possibility of establishing an APEC-wide trademark system; a proposal by Prime
Minister Keating of Australia that APEC consider developing a so-called "smart card" for
APEC business executives that could be used to facilitate business travel throughout the APEC
membership, among other measures. See Foreign Press Center Briefing with Sandra Kristoff,
U.S. Coordinator for APEC Affairs, Nov. 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CURNWS File [hereinafter Kristoff].
156 See, e.g., APEC: Goals and Opportunities, Statement before the House Committee on
International Relations, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 104th Cong. (Nov. 9, 1995)
(statement of Willard Workman, U.S. Chamber of Commerce). See also PACipiC Busnmss FoRIUM, Tim OSAKA ACrMON PLAN: ROADMAP To REAUZING TiE APEC VIsION (1995); Pacific

Basin Economic Council (PBEC), Implementing Free Trade and Investment in the Pacific Region,
U.S. Member Committee Report (May 18, 1996). This report recommends that "Pacific economies should recognize that the region's businesses need to see concrete effects now, both to
boost economic activity and to build increased support for liberalization efforts. Meaningful
progress cannot wait until the next century." Id.
157 See APEC Busriss ADViSoRY CoUNcIL, supranote 131, at 2. A concrete business facilitation undertaking that came out of the Manila meetings was an agreement among Australia,
Korea and the Philippines to initiate an APEC wide business travel card in 1997, designed to
reduced burdensome visa requirements. See Leaders' Declaration, supranote 73.
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E. APEC's Contribution to Broader Aspects of Regional
Integration and Cooperation
While APEC's contribution to trade liberalization, regional as
well as global, offers a mixed picture, and its trade facilitation features
are still at an early stage of implementation, APEC has already made
a contribution to regional cooperation by building confidence in its
members in their ability to cooperate; by serving as a nascent geopolitical forum; and by establishing broad and ambitious goals for the
future. Let us examine each of these elements in turn.
1. APEC as a Confidence Building Exercise
In seven years, APEC has succeeded in developing a structured
context for ongoing consultations on economic and trade issues of interest and concern to its members. When viewed from the perspective
of their early meetings, which were cautious and tentative, APEC
members have been able to develop consensus positions on issues
such as membership, work programs and overall goals. APEC has also
been able to fashion pragmatic responses to a number of divisive
158
issues.
The number of consultative meetings between trade, foreign, finance, and other ministers from the region has steadily increased to
the point that such meetings are now uncontroversial. 59 In between
ministerial meetings, senior officials regularly meet to review progress
on the established work programs and to develop recommendations to
Ministers. Numerous lower-level meetings occur between expert
groups. APEC therefore has introduced a degree of consultation
among government officials on a wide range of economic issues that
simply did not exist prior to its formation.
As a related point, it should be noted that APEC often is commended for enhancing the confidence of regional officials in their ability to cooperate on economic issues. Given the economic, political,
158 For example, as noted in Section B above, early in the APEC process, the Asian members
were concerned that APEC would dilute or undermine their interests. This concern was ultimately mitigated by the pragmatic agreement by the APEC members to give the Asian members
particular prominence in the APEC process by rotating the APEC Chair between an Asian and
a non-Asian member. Later, at Osaka, the U.S. interest in ensuring that the Osaka Action
Agenda included an undertaking on comprehensiveness was resisted by those members that
sought exceptions for sensitive sectors such as agriculture. The inclusion of a flexibility principle
offered a pragmatic interim approach to keep the process moving forward.
159 For example, it was expected that in 1996, some nine ministerial meetings were to occur
under the APEC auspices. These include meetings with human resource or labor ministers,
science and technology ministers, energy ministers, finance ministers, foreign ministers, among
others.
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religious and cultural diversity of the region, and its history of little by
way of cooperative economic endeavors at the policy level, the APEC
forum has become at a minimum a bully pulpit for developing a sense
that they are indeed part of a budding regional "community."
2. APEC as a Geo-PoliticalForum
APEC already has developed a limited geo-political dimension.
As one official has put it, "[w]e are all in the room together because
we want to promote not only prosperity, but stability and security in
the Asia-Pacific. APEC is a prime vehicle for bringing together China,
Japan, and the United States - which are the key three players that are
going to emerge as the triad balance of power over the next 10 to 15
years.' 6 0
The Leader's Meetings have been an especially important development in this regard. Although APEC has not been a venue for
ameliorating serious points of tension between individual countries
(i.e., between the United States and Japan on trade matters, or between the United States and China on trade, human rights, proliferation, and security issues), it has provided a venue through which
officials have been able to cooperate in a constructive fashion on a
broad range of work programs. APEC meetings also have afforded
Leader's and Minister's with the opportunity to convene separate bilateral meetings that can have a diplomatic value broader than the
APEC agenda. This may be especially relevant with respect to U.S.China relations.
Given the serious rift in U.S.-China relations that has developed
in the post-Tiannamen period, APEC has offered one of the few settings in which senior U.S. foreign policy officials have had a chance to
meet with their Chinese counterparts. And even aside from the bilateral meetings that have occurred on the fringes of the APEC meetings, APEC has been one of the very few venues through which the
United States (as well as the other APEC members) have been able to
engage Chinese officials in relatively nonconfrontational policy discussions about economic reform in the PRC. The recent meetings between President Clinton and President Jiang Zemin at the Manila
APEC meetings were, for example, one such occassion where broader
geo-political aspects of U.S.-China relations were addressed and
where Presidents Clinton and Jiang announced that they will exchange visits in 1997 and 1998.
160 See Kristoff, supra note 155.
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Looking ahead, it would seem likely that given the importance of
the United States, Japan, and other APEC members as investors in
the PRC and as major export markets for PRC exports, that APEC
could prove an important setting for facilitating and encouraging the
integration of China into the global economy.
3. APEC as a Goal Setter
The Bogor Declaration of free trade in the region by 2020/2010
has given APEC an ambitious target. Leadership endorsement of this
goal has injected in the APEC process a degree of enthusiasm and
direction that had not existed previously. The Bogor vision has established a benchmark against which all future APEC undertakings will
be evaluated. The question that now has been embedded into the
APEC process is this: Are the measures proposed advancing APEC
toward the Bogor goal or not?
At the same time, the announcement of the goal of achieving free
trade in the region by 2020/2010 is not without its risks. As U.S. business groups have noted, the 2020/2010 date is so far in the distant future that it runs the twofold risk of distracting government officials
from addressing pressing economic and trade issues and "burdening
161
APEC with unrealistic expectations.'
F. APEC's Institutional Future
Thus far the APEC forum has kept its institutional mechanisms
to a minimum. This has been the clear preference of the majority of its
members. Some scholars have argued that the issue is not whether
APEC should become more institutionalized but how quickly and in
what manner this should occur. Some have argued that APEC's structure should develop gradually. 62
It has also been argued that the very agreement to dismantle
trade and investment barriers by 2020 could not have been achieved
"through the European approach to cooperation, which relies on the
drafting and ratification by all participants of legally binding international agreements or treaties."' 63 This is an interesting point that
161 See PRIDSMENT's ADVISORY

COMMrrrEE FOR TRADE PoLIcy AND

NEGOTIATIONS

(ACTPN), RECOMMENDATIONS ON AsIA (Sept. 14, 1995).

162 See Hadi Soesatro, The InstitutionalFrameworkfor APEC: An Asean Perspective, APEC
CHALLENGFS AND OPPORTUNnIms (Chia Slow Yue ed., 1994).

163 Andrew Elek, APEC: An Open Economic Association in the Asia Pacific, in REGIONAL
INTEGRATION iN TE AsIA PACIFIC (Bijit Bora & Christopher Findlay eds., 1996), at 227.
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highlights some important features differentiating APEC from other,
notably European, approaches to regional economic integration.
The motivation behind the creation of the European Community
has arguably been as much political as economic. It has reflected a
hope that greater economic interdependence will promote not only
economic prosperity but a peace which had eluded Europe in the first
part of the century. This motivation served to induce European states
to eventually cede substantial sovereignty to those newly created institutions that acted on the basis of their judgment of what was in the
EC's interest rather than the interest of a member state. These institutions were, in turn, endowed with extensive law-making powers. In
the European context, supranational institutional mechanisms were
developed that served to advance the "community" aspects of integration in Europe. 164
In the Asia-Pacific region, the factors driving APEC while not
devoid of political content, have chiefly been economic in nature.
APEC has developed in response to the growing inter-regional trade
and investment flows. The primary actors promoting integration have
been firms, not governments. And thus far, the members of APEC
have not seen it as either feasible nor desirable for APEC to develop
an institutional structure analogous to that of the EU.
For APEC to do so would mean taking a leap of faith that the
collective interests of its members require that individual countries
subsume a meaningful degree of economic autonomy in the design
and implementation of their economic and trade policies to the
greater economic good of all of the APEC members. Further, this
vision would require that the APEC organization be entrusted with
some regulatory and enforcement capabilities. No such shared under164 See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformationof Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403 (1991). In this
seminal article, Professor Weiler argues that the 1951 Treaty of Paris establishing the European
Coal and Steel Community, "despite their economic content, are best seen as a long-term and
transformative strategy for peace among the states of Western Europe, principally France and
Germany." Id. at 2478. Weiler sees the concept of "community" in the transnational European
context to mean "a different type of intercourse among the actors belonging to it, a type of selflimitation in their self-perception, a redefined self-interest, adherence, redefined policy goals....
But crucially, it does not extinguish the separate actors that are fated to live in an uneasy tension
with two competing senses of the polity's self: the autonomous self and the self as part of a larger
community." Id. at 2480. See also Jean Monnet, Economic Integration: New Forms of Partnership, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, Perspectives On Peace, 1910-1960 (1960), at
97-107. In this essay, Jean Monnet argues that "[t]he common market for coal and steel was only
the first limited step to unity, but it created the conditions which made others possible. It prepared the astonishing reconciliation between France and Germany. The binding force of common institutions was essential in this process." Id. at 101.
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lying sense of community or vision of collective interest presently exists within APEC.
Although the United States (and sometimes Canada, Australia,
and others) often is identified as the outlier given its preference for
achieving more formalized arrangements, especially with respect to
liberalization of trade - even the most legalistic of APEC's members
have not called for the creation of an expanded APEC bureaucracy or
the development of a new supra-national authority to administer or
develop APEC-wide rules.
There have, however, been proposals to further institutionalize
APEC through the various non-binding codes described above, as
well as through the creation of an APEC dispute mediation system
that would "supplement, rather than compete" with the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism, especially with regard to areas not yet subject
to WTO disciplines - i.e., deregulation, investment, competition pol165
icy, etc.
The value of an APEC dispute mediation capability, at least with
respect to government to government disputes, is not self-evident.
Dispute settlement procedures have been substantially enhanced
through the Uruguay Round. And early evidence suggests that it is
being used. As of this writing, some 62 disputes have been taken to
the WTO, 19 of these represent disputes between APEC members. 66
Given the interest of the APEC members in ensuring that the
WTO dispute settlement procedures are used and respected, it is not
obvious what a regional mechanism would contribute. The EPG Reports that have urged the creation of an APEC mediation capability
stress, as noted, that it should be used for matters currently outside
WTO disciplines. But unlike dispute settlement procedures in the
NAFTA or the WTO, in the APEC context there are no underlying
agreements to be interpreted or enforced. This suggests that mediation would likely turn on the assessment of the mediators of what is
fair to the parties concerned. If so, this raises several different
complexities.
If the subject matter of the dispute pertains to a substantive legal
matter, for example rights that are conferred by antitrust laws, such
165 See 1994 EPG RaPORT, supra note 47, at 23-24. The EPG recommended that APEC
should create a Dispute Mediation Service (DMS) that would operate on a voluntary basis to
"provide assistance in resolving (and thus, over time, perhaps avoiding) economic disputes
among its members." Id. at 24. This proposal was taken up in the Bogor Declaration, where the
Leaders "agreed to examine the possibility of a voluntary consultative dispute mediation service." See Bogor Declaration, supra note 52.
166 See <http:lwww.wto.orgfWTO/disputelbuletin>.
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rights may be inappropriate for enforcement by mediation or arbitration.167 At a minimum in the APEC context, it is difficult to imagine
what standards would be applied.
More fundamentally, as others have noted, the contentious bilateral "disputes" between the United States and a number of APEC
countries are not simply disputes about process, but rather represent
contentious trade negotiations. These are matters that in some instances could not be brought before the WTO because they do not
involve practices that violate existing trade agreements nor practices
that squarely fit under the-GATT provisions governing practices that
168
"nullify or impair" rights under a trade agreement.
Practices that can be caught, for example, by the definition of
"unreasonable" in section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, as amended, are
very broad. In general, these include practices that are not necessarily
inconsistent with the international legal rights of the United States but
are deemed otherwise unfair and inequitable and can, for example,
167 In the United States, for example, prior to 1985, U.S. Courts of Appeals that decided the
question of the arbitrability of antitrust claims held that an agreement to arbitrate an antitrust
claims was against public policy. See American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co.,
391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). This case identified three reasons for refusing to allow arbitration of
domestic antitrust claims: first, that such claims involve a broad range of interests including promotion of "the national interest in a competitive economy." ld.
at 826. Second, because the
issues and evidence in resolving private antitrust cases can reach "swollen proportions." Id.at
827. And third, that it would be questionable to entrust antitrust claims to arbitrators because
arbitrators are "frequently men drawn for their business expertise," and "it is the business community generally that is regulated by the antitrust laws." Id. Then, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court refused to follow the
American Safety doctrine in the context of a dispute arising out of an international agreement
that included an arbitration clause. The opinion stressed the significance of maintaining international comity as a ground for upholding arbitration agreements even if a different rule might be
applied to purely domestic agreements. In the international context, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational
tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in
the resolution of disputes all require enforcement of an arbitration clause in a private dispute.
Since Mitsubishi,courts have struggled to decide whether domestic antitrust cases are arbitrable.
In Kotam Electronics, Inv. v. JBL Consumer Products, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit initially held
that Mitsubishi does not require reversal of controlling circuit court precedent that antitrust
claims are not arbitrable. The Court relied on the public policy arguments contained in American Safety Equipment. Later, the court vacated its decision and the case will be reheard en
bane. 59 F. 3d 1155 (11th Cir.), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, 69 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1995).
Other circuits have reached different conclusions and rejected the policy considerations of
American Safety Equipment. See Coors Brewing Co. v. Molson Breweries, 51 F.3d 1511 (10th
Cir. 1995); Nghiem v. NEC Electronic, Inc., 25 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 115 S.Ct. 638
(1994) (agreements to arbitrate antitrust disputes is enforceable.); Sanjuan v. American Board of
Psychiatry and Neurology, 40 F.3d 247 (7th Cir. 1994).
168 See Green, supra note 4, at 722
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include foreign government toleration of anticompetitive conduct that
restricts U.S. exports, which are not covered by WTO rules.
When conducting a formal 301 investigation, the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative engages in fact-finding and consultations
with the foreign government about the alleged barriers to market access. No single or uniform methodology is employed in the review of a
claim of unfairness.
Further, although the petitioner has a burden of persuasion and is
obliged to provide evidence of the practices that have given rise to the
claim of unfairness, the evidentiary standards are not defined in a
section 301 market access case and rest on an assessment by the U.S.
Trade Representative. Negotiation rather than adjudication is a hallmark of the 301 process. If the foreign government is prepared to
enter into negotiations with the U.S. government, as a practical matter
(although not as a matter of law) the burden of persuasion can soon
shift to the foreign government.
Although some countries may find attractive the idea of using a
regional dispute mediation service as an instrument to blunt U.S. bilateralism - especially when the United States invokes section 301 of
its trade laws to address practices abroad that it deems unreasonable it is almost inconceivable that the United States would bring such mat16 9
ters before a voluntary mediation service.
G.

Assessment and Summary

Overall, this interim assessment of APEC suggests that it should
be viewed positively if evaluated from the perspective of an early effort to facilitate regional economic integration in an environment
characterized by a historic lack of policy cooperation. The process is,
however, likely to be an incremental one that will frustrate those who
believe that APEC should be a vehicle for significantly accelerating
the pace of trade liberalization in the Asia-Pacific region.

169 As noted by Professor Green, "given the unpopularity of the United States' "aggressive
unilateralism," there is little prospect that the United States would prevail before a mediation
body even in cases where there is some sympathy for the goals the United States is pursuing."
See Green, supra note 4, at 725. More recently, press reports indicate that senior Chinese offi-

cials have called for a dispute mediation service within APEC because of their interest in resolving disputes with the United States outside of bilateral channels. See also Lara Parpan, China
Pushes for Mediation Forum in APEC, AoENcE FRANCE PRESS, May 24, 1996, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS file.
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III.

IMPORTANT CHALLENGES FACING

APEC

Since APEC is still in its infancy, it will face numerous analytical
and policy challenges in the years ahead. This discussion will highlight
three: the role for ideas, action, and leadership.
A. The Role for Ideas
In recent years, numerous studies have been undertaken by economists that have identified the costs and benefits of trade liberalization in the Asia-Pacific region under different assumptions - i.e.,
regional liberalization by different groups of countries in the Asia-Pacific on an MFN, non-MFN, sectoral, or other basis. Relatively few
studies have sought to identify where the built-in incentives for liberalization among APEC countries are the greatest because of the predominance of trade between and among APEC economies.
If we bear in mind the tensions discussed in Section II above namely that APEC as a whole has committed itself to WTO-consistent
liberalization yet there remain substantial concerns among APEC
members about the free rider problems associated with MFN liberalization - then a challenge for policymakers will be to identify those
areas in which the benefits of trade liberalization will be the greatest
among the APEC members and the free-rider problem will be
minimized.
Two recent research approaches have examined this question by
identifying where APEC countries are the predominant suppliers in
the region. An American and an Australian economist each independently undertook analyses of trade among APEC economies, to identify those areas in which APEC members are predominant global
suppliers and therefore MFN liberalization could have positive effects
for APEC members and also minimize the free-rider problem.
The study undertaken by an American economist identified products where APEC countries provide 80 percent of world exports and
which products also cover some 19 percent of APEC's exports and
some 16 percent of APEC's imports. 170 Looking at product categories, the study argued that electronic equipment is probably the best
candidate for liberalization because of the high volume of trade in this
sector, the fact that the headquarters and production facilities of the
170 See Paul Wonnacott, Merchandise Trade in the APEC Region: Is there Scope for Liberalization on an MFN Basis?, Institute For International Economics (1994). Smaller thresholds
change the gain from negotiation. For example, if negotiations only covered products where
APEC countries provide 90% of World exports, this would only make up three percent of APEC
exports. Id.
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major global producers are located in APEC countries, and the fact
that tariffs remain high. 17 1 Tariffs still are above 10 percent in a
number of categories in about half of the APEC countries, thus providing significant scope for liberalization in this category. South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand have trade surpluses in the
area of electronics products. Yet, they also maintain high tariffs on
some of these products. 72
A second study undertaken by an Australian economist has identified commodities in which APEC members supply 75 percent or
more of the region's import markets and also account for nearly 66
percent of total exports from APEC.173 This study argued that such a
sectoral approach to trade liberalization would prove useful in accelerating progress toward free trade in the region and also would be
consistent with multilateral rules. 7 4

Looking ahead, we see that much additional work could usefully
be undertaken to inform policymakers of the relative economic gains
of different approaches that might be undertaken, as well as to offer
practical suggestions as to those areas where the benefits of further
liberalization on an MFN basis would redound primarily to APEC
members but would also prove consistent with multilateral rules. 75

171 Items that fit under this category include: TV recorders, TV cameras, receivers, and picture tubes. Id.
172 Ld.
173 See Garnaut & Drysdale, supra note 7.
174 The World Bank has also undertaken a general study comparing the economic consequences of various approaches to trade liberalization in the region, including through MFN liberalization. It suggests that MFN liberalization could usefully focus on those sectors in which
regional complementarity is high or where resource endowments, transport costs, or technological differences limit competition from outside the region. Three sectors are noted in this regard,
textiles, services, and processed minerals. See INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCION
AND DEVELOPMENT, EAST ASIA's TRADE AND INvEsTMENT: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL GAINs
FROM LIBERAUZATION (1994). An Australian analyst has argued that the process of mutual
enforcement of trade liberalization would be stronger, and short-term gains could be accelerated
if APEC focused on sectors of particular strategic significance. Although only briefly mentioned, he identified steel and steel products, processed minerals, grains, textiles, clothing and
fibers, and aviation in this regard. See Andrew Elek, APEC:An Open Association, in REGIONAL

INTEGRATION AND THE AsIA-PAcIFic (Bijit Bora and Christopher Findley eds., 1996), at 230.
175 The International Trade Commission (ITC) completed a report in June 1996 for the Office

of the U.S. Trade Representative that also identified areas with a high percentage of intra-APEC
trade. As of this writing, this Report had not yet been released to the public. See International
Trade Commission, U.S. Interests In APEC Trade Liberalization, Investigation 332-364 (Jan. 24,
1996) <http://www.usitc.govinforn>.
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B. The Role for Action
APEC's central challenge in the years ahead will be to continue
to prove valuable to its members. All three legs of the APEC agenda
- trade and investment facilitation, cooperation, and liberalization will be important in this regard, but perhaps none will prove more
challenging than trade liberalization.
The November 1996 Manila meetings have been the most recent
testing ground, although not in any sense the final one, of APEC's
ability to deliver meaningful liberalization by means of the uniqud approach agreed upon in Osaka. But expectations for Manila should
have been modest for a number of near-term and more fundamental
reasons.
In the near term, the Clinton Administration, having failed to secure fast-track authority from the U.S. Congress,' 7 6 had no authority
to offer broad-based trade-liberalizing proposals in the context of its
APEC individual action plan. It did retain negotiating authority attained from the U.S. Congress during the implementation of the Uruguay Round to negotiate and proclaim further tariff reductions with
respect to
those tariff categories negotiated during the Uruguay
7
Round.

17

As explained in the Statement of Administrative Action (SAP),
the Uruguay Round did not succeed in obtaining complete duty elimination in some of the sectors where Congress gave the Administration
authority to negotiate the elimination of tariffs. Examples of these socalled zero-for-zero tariff areas include: wood products, electronics,
distilled spirits, non-ferrous metals, and oilseeds and oilseed products,
among other sectors. The SAP states plainly that "obtaining further
reductions and elimination of duties in these sectors is a priority objective for U.S. multilateral, regional and bilateral negotiations." And
in other areas, where the U.S. did achieve duty elimination, the Con176 The fast track process for trade agreements was introduced in the 1974 Trade Act. Fast
track consists of certain expedited procedures that, if followed, ensure that once the trade implementing bill is submitted to the Congress it will be voted on quickly by both houses of Congress

without amendment.
177 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, Sec. 111, 108 Stat 4809, 4809
(1994). Section III(b) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) which states: ".. .the
President may proclaim - (1) the modification of any duty or staged rate reduction of any duty
set forth in Schedule XX if - (A) the United States agrees to such modification or staged rate
reduction in a multilateral negotiation under the auspices of the WTO, and (B) such modification or stage rate reduction applies to the rate of duty on an article contained in a tariff category
that was the subject of reciprocal duty elimination or harmonization negotiations during the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, and (2) such modifications as are necessary to
correct technical errors in Schedule XX or to make other rectifications to the Schedule." Id.
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gress encouraged the Administration to "pursue accelerated staging of
tariff reductions as a priority trade objective."'1 78
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), which implemented the Uruguay Round accord, permits the U.S. Administration
to provide some "limited incentives" for other WTO members to
enter into negotiations to reduce their tariffs in order to get tariff reduction commitments from the United States. Congress also indicated
that while it thought multilateral agreement to engage in such reductions or accelerated staging will "help ensure that the United States
receives adequate benefits in return for action in this area," it was not
limiting the Administration in pursuing only multilateral
approaches.179
Hence, it is not surprising that in the run-up to the Manila APEC
meetings, U.S. trade officials were suggesting that the United States
was considering proposing early trade liberalization in at least the four
sectors of wood products, oil seed products, nonferrous metals, and
information technologies. 80 Furthermore, given the nature of the authority vested in the Administration, it is not surprising that U.S. offers in these areas would be contingent upon comparable concessions
from other APEC member countries that must then be bound at the
WTO.

Only the category of information technologies represented a sector of significant trade intensity between the United States and the
Asia-Pacific region. This view is also consistent with the conclusions
of the academic studies alluded to above. For example, total U.S. exports of oil seed products to APEC countries amounted to only $3.57
billion in 1995, which represents only one percent of total U.S. exports
to APEC countries; although it represents some 52.7% of total U.S.
exports of these products.' 8 In contrast, if we assume that the information technologies alluded to above include at least computers,
semiconductors, telecommunications products, and scientific equipment, total U.S. exports to APEC countries amounted to $58 billion in
1995, which represents 16 percent of total U.S. exports to APEC
countries and 65 percent of total U.S. exports in this sector.'8
178 Sectors noted in this regard included paper, paper products, and soda ash. Ld.
at 701.
179 On this point, the SAP states: "It is not anticipated that participation in such agreements
by all WTO members would be necessary and in some cases agreement with a limited number of
countries with major trading interests in a particular sector would be sufficient." Id.at 702.
180 See Barshefsky, supra note 7.
181 See Wornacott, supra note 170.

182 See DEPARTMENT OF COMmERCE, NATIONAL TRADE DATA BANK (1995).
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In comparison, U.S. imports of oilseed products from APEC
countries amount to $400 million in 1995, which represents 59.7% of
total U.S. imports of oilseeds but only 0.8 percent of total U.S. imports
from APEC economies. Once again, the trade significance of information technologies is far greater since imports from APEC amounted to
$93 billion in 1995, which represented 18 percent of total U.S. imports
from APEC
economies and 90 percent of total U.S. imports of this
18 3
category.

Despite the relative openness of the U.S. economy, in contrast to
the other APEC economies and despite the much repeated insistence
by many members of APEC that they are liberalizing for their own
reasons irrespective of the actions of others, it is rare indeed to hear
officials from APEC countries argue even as a rhetorical matter that
the United States should free ride on Asian liberalization.
There are other features of the APEC process that do not require
the U.S. Administration to obtain negotiating authority from the Congress and that are relatively less controversial than trade liberalization. It is perhaps in those other areas that we should expect to see
emerge the most significant initiatives within APEC in the near term i.e., in the areas of development cooperation and business facilitation.
In addition, the Leader's Meetings provide a unique opportunity
for the strengthening of the geopolitical aspect of the APEC forum.
This dimension of APEC is relatively underdeveloped and offers substantial room for policy initiatives in the years ahead.
Over the medium term, the questions remains: Will the "APEC
way" of trade liberalization produce substantial progress towards implementation of the Bogor vision? How likely is it that APEC will
produce meaningful liberalization on a regional basis that is also
WTO-consistent and does not reduce incentives for trade liberalization on a global basis? As with so many fundamental APEC issues,
this central challenge remains not only unresolved but also under-developed at a conceptual level.
C. The Role for Leadership?
Given the ambitious goals that APEC has identified for itself,
what is the role for leadership on trade liberalization and facilitation
by individual countries within APEC? In particular, what role for the
major countries within APEC such as Japan, China and the United
183 Id.
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States? These questions do not lend themselves to brief reply, but a
few dimensions are worth mention herein.
First, the role that China can and will choose to play within
APEC is almost entirely speculative at this point. One can imagine,
for example, that since the Chinese economy is still at an early stage
of reforming, China is unlikely to make a priority of trade liberalization, except as necessary to achieve domestic economic priorities or
gain admission to the WTO. More likely, China will continue to use
the APEC forum as a vehicle for developing and deepening consultative and cooperative activities with its major trading partners in the
region. APEC may also be used by China as a forum for garnering
support from the Asian members of APEC for its admission to the
WTO and resistance to U.S. bilateral trade approaches toward the
PRC.
Japan's role in APEC is important for obvious reasons: it is a major investor in the region, a major exporter to APEC members and
increasingly an important market for APEC country exports.3 Japan
has been particularly active within the APEC work programs in support of its development and human resource programs. It has gradually come to develop its own identity within the region, but within
APEC it often is associated, along with China and Malaysia, with a
"go slow" approach to free trade. 185
Given the size and importance of the U.S. market and its continued importance as a security presence in the Asia-Pacific region, U.S.
leadership in APEC unquestionably will remain important.186 To a
significant degree, the eventual direction that APEC takes will be influenced by the leadership exercised or not exercised by the United
States. 87
184 As of the end of 1995, for example, Japan was either the largest or second largest export
market for 11 of the APEC economies - Australia, Canada, Chile, Brunei, Thailand, Indonesia,
Philippines, Korea, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, and the United States. See UNrED NA.
TONS, TRADE STATISnCS 1995 (1995).

185 See FuNABAsHi, supra note 15. In this excellent analysis, Funabashi argues that APEC
has provided Japan with a means for gradually finding a regional and multilateral framework for
its Asia policy. But, he argues, Japan has not been able to pursue a dynamic policy on APEC's
liberalization and cooperation agendas. Instead, Japan has attempted to use its bureaucratic
instruments to smooth the way for developing nations. He concludes that Japan's "ineffective
APEC diplomacy was a result of its lack of political leadership that could prioritize its interests
in the forum and the region." Id at 190, 202.
186 The United States is either the largest or second largest export market for 13 of the APEC
economies - Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines,
China, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Japan. See TRADE STATISTICS, supra note 184.

187 An important underlying trade trend that is often overlooked is that while the U.S. remains a major market for exports from APEC countries, on a relative basis it is less important
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But the U.S. obviously faces a number of challenges in its exercise of leadership in APEC. First, within APEC itself there is the tension discussed earlier between the United States government
emphasis on trade liberalization and other members of APEC who
see cooperation and facilitation as equally if not more important aspects of the APEC agenda. Second, much resentment lingers towards
the United States over its continued use of bilateral self-help instruments such as section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act. Regardless of
whether the use of section 301 is warranted in specific instances, these
investigations are unwelcome.
Despite recent remarks by Japanese trade officials that have suggested that bilateral approaches to trade negotiation are obsolete in
the new WTO era, bilateral trade disputes are almost certain to continue."8 Many areas of trade are not fully subject to multilateral disciplines and it is here that views on appropriate U.S. responses to
trade distorting measures abroad are likely to remain especially
controversial.
But even aside from how the United States chooses to pursue its
bilateral agenda, it faces a number of challenges in its exercise of leadership within the APEC forum. Many Asian members of APEC have
evinced a marked disinclination to have APEC develop into a full
blown negotiating forum. There appears to be considerable antipathy
toward perceived U.S. preferences for firm and binding commitments,
codified in formal arrangements.
Thus, for U.S. policy makers, APEC presents a twofold challenge.
On the one hand, in order to sustain the attention of its political leadership and the support of its publics, APEC must produce the concrete gains identified in Bogor. Yet, as mentioned above, without fast
track authority from the U.S. Congress, the U.S. government has limited negotiating authority to propose new trade liberalization measures either within APEC or globally. On the other hand, over and
above these domestic constraints, the U.S. is being challenged within
APEC to develop a more consensual leadership style.
than in years past. See, e.g.,

AsIA AS THE NEW
(1994). In this book, Dr. Abegglen presents data that shows that
since the mid-1980s, while U.S. exports to Asia as a share of total exports has grown, Asian
exports to the United States as a percentage of its total exports has significantly declined and
Asian exports to the rest of Asia have increased significantly. Id. at 76.
188 See Yoshiro Sakamoto, Vice Minister, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Remarks at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan (Mar. 15, 1996) (available on file with M.E.
JAMES C. ABEGGLEN, SEA CHANGE: PACIFIC

WORLD INDUSThIAL CEmTER

Janow).
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

We may infer from the foregoing discussion that several scenarios
are possible for APEC's future.
The first, and arguably most likely scenario for the foreseeable
future is a continuation of the status quo. This does not imply stasis.
Rather, it suggests an approach whereby APEC members will continue to enhance their cooperative work programs and continue to
liberalize their economies, largely through their own domestic initiatives but partly as a result of the APEC process. Dramatic steps in the
area of trade liberalization, to the extent that such steps are taken, are
more likely to be the result of market forces rather than APEC-driven
policy initiatives. Indeed, as the discussion in Section II illustrated,
APEC itself has produced only modest specific undertakings in the
area of trade liberalization. And the APEC methodology of voluntary
measures, while both unique and popular among APEC's Asian members because it is neither coercive nor the result of bargaining among
trade officials, has yet to demonstrate that it can produce meaningful
results over time. In other words, the process is lengthy, and it is far
from transparent whether the APEC announced liberalization initiatives are resulting in steps that are improving the economic performance of liberalizing economies or providing significantly expanded
access for products and services from other economies, notably other
APEC economies. But, as we have seen at the recent Manila meetings and indeed the Seattle meetings, a continuation of current trends
also implies that APEC can continue to be a setting where steps are
taken that can help to pave the way for WTO-based trade negotiataken in APEC and in the WTO
tions. And, in this sense, the 8actions
9
reinforcing.'
mutually
be
can
The divisive issue of MFN or non-MFN liberalization within the
APEC context is unlikely to be resolved in the short term. The successful pursuit in APEC of MFN liberalization (including by the
United States) is likely to require policy makers to either identify
those areas where the benefits of trade liberalization will be the greatest among the APEC members and the free-rider problem will be
minimized or will require APEC to serve as the catalyst for broader
trade liberalization within the WTO context.
189 This appears to be even more likely when APEC meetings occur in near proximity to
meetings of the GATT or WTO. The Manila meetings of APEC, for example, coming as they did
just a short period of time before the first WTO ministerial in Singapore served to galvanize the
APEC members to produce undertakings that can contribute to global trade liberalization and
facilitation or at a minimum not detract from global trade objectives.
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A continuation of the status quo for APEC also is likely to require some further degree of institutional development. Yet absent a
significant change in the external environment, the institutional development of APEC is likely to be minimal. There appears to be little if
any interest in the development of a regional legal regime that is
outside the individual control of its members. To go beyond the current approach and to develop a regional body with meaningful rulemaking, enforcement or adjudicative powers would require the emergence of a different calculus of national self-interest than APEC has
given any evidence of producing to date. And the very substantial
differences in the legal cultures among APEC members is especially
likely to make rulemaking difficult.' 90
It is more likely that APEC will continue to experiment with various nonbinding agreements in functional areas (i.e., government procurement, MRAs, services, perhaps competition policy) that could
prove constructive over the long term future, particularly if these areas receive renewed attention at the level of multilateral trade negotiations. Current indications suggest that APEC will continue to adhere
to WTO rules and to pursue multilateral liberalization but will not,
absent more definitive leadership by some cluster of its members (particularly the United States), be the driver of another round of multilateral trade negotiations.
A second possible course that APEC may yet decide to pursue is
to become a more formalized regional trading arrangement.
Although at some instances along the way certain APEC members
have indicated an interest in joining the NAFrA, 191 the EPG had concluded that piecemeal accession by APEC countries to the NAFTA
would generate new discrimination within the region. Therefore the
concept of NAFTA accession has lain largely dormant in recent years.
The idea of a partial or full APEC FTA has not been advanced by
APEC as a group; although it has been debated among scholars and
policy makers for some time.
The above scenario seems unlikely for a number of reasons. One
key reason is the obvious reluctance of APEC's members to enter into
a trading arrangement that is a discriminatory trading bloc with meaningful economic consequences that might engender inward looking responses from other regional blocs.
190 See Green, supra note 4.
191 Senior officials from Singapore and Korea have indicated an interest in associating in
some way with NAFTA. See C. Fred Bergsten, APEC and the World Economy, in AsIA PACIC
REGIONAUSM, supra note 7, at 222.
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Second, one of the commonly heard rationales for entering into a
free trade arrangement with a handful of countries is that such an approach offers a faster and easier method of achieving significant trade
liberalization than if the same steps were negotiated at the global level
with all of the members of the WTO. Although this proposition has
been challenged, 192 the proliferation of FTAs suggest that at least for
some purposes countries have seen regional arrangements as providing some benefits. This same logic applies far less wel in the context
of the diverse economies of the Asia-Pacific region.
The traditional elements of FTAs (i.e., tariffs, quotas, investment
restrictions, etc.) do not get to the heart of the trade frictions between
two of the 'largest and most important economic powers of APEC: the
United States and Japan. Existing levels of tariffs in Japan and the
United States are relatively low. The trade frictions between the
United States and Japan increasingly stem from the perceived role of
structural or non-tariff barriers to trade, including such diverse elements as impediments to market access in Japan's distribution sector,
non-transparent government procurement practices, regulatory constraints, and allegedly exclusionary business practices. It is extremely
difficult to see how these problems could effectively be addressed
through an FTA inclusive of the United States.
The United States almost certainly would have similar and additional concerns if it were to consider entering into a regional FTA that
included China. Although in the last 15 years China has moved rapidly to liberalize its economy, there is still a long road before it. It
remains a socialist economy in transition. China is still trying to reach
internal as well as international agreement on the measures that it will
undertake in order to bring its domestic regime in conformity with
basic WTO disciplines. In the United States, one can expect there to
be a great deal of concern over competition from China's low-wage
workers. As others have noted, it is hard to envision that the political
economy of trade in the United States could sustain free entry of Chinese textiles and apparel.19 3 It is also far from clear whether China
would be prepared to enter into negotiations toward the creation of a
regional FTA. Although it has been supportive of APEC, it remains
suspicious about both U.S. and Japanese intentions in ihe region.

192 See Jagdish Bhagwati, Regionalism and Multilateralism:An Overview, in ASIA PACIFIC
REGIONALISM, supra note 7, at 145.
193 See Ross GARNAuT, OMONS FOR ASIA-PACIIC TRADE LiBERALUZATION (A PACIFIC
FREE TRADE AREA?)
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An FrA formed from a cluster of APEC countries, such as between the United States, Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand and possibly South Korea, would be likely to raise somewhat
fewer concerns in the United States about invisible barriers to trade
and investment, but most likely would be opposed by Japan and
China. Therefore, for economic as well as political reasons, an APEC
FTA seems neither a desirable nor a feasible notion.
A third possible scenario is that APEC will stagnate owing to the
differing perspectives among its members about the pace and scope of
liberalization in trade and investment. This seems a more distinct possibility than the second scenario identified above. In the absence of
meaningful momentum on at least some of the areas of the APEC
agenda, it may prove difficult to sustain the attention of political
leaders.
On balance, at least for the foreseeable future, a number of factors are likely to combine to keep APEC alive: the economic dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region, the growing importance of crosstrade and investment and the shared interest of political leaders and
business executives from the APEC region in enhanced access to each
other's and global markets.
A basic reason for optimism over the long term therefore stems
less from expectations of visionary policy initiatives coming out of
APEC than from the economic dynamism of the region itself. It is
this underlying economic vitality that is spurring economic integration
and the APEC process onward - in some instances even when neither
sought nor anticipated by local officials. For countries that rely so
heavily on export markets, this has less to do with abstract principles
than with economic good sense. APEC was born as an outcome of
economic factors; it has not been the vehicle that generated the
growth of cross-trade and investment.
If one accepts this vision of trade and investment in the AsiaPacific, the key questions for the future pertain less to the direction of
change for APEC's member economies, which is decidedly pointing
toward more open markets and increased cross trade and investment,
than to the pace and comprehensiveness of the reforms that are being
put in place.
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